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OBSCURED BY “WILLFUL BLINDNESS”: 
STATES’ PREVENTIVE OBLIGATIONS AND 
THE MEANING OF ACQUIESCENCE UNDER 
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
Jon Bauer* 
ABSTRACT 
As U.S. asylum law becomes more restrictive, relief under the 
U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT) has become the last hope for 
safety for many asylum seekers. But for those who face torture at the 
hands of non-State actors, CAT relief has proven extraordinarily hard 
to win. The CAT’s torture definition encompasses privately-inflicted 
harm only when it occurs with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official. Agency decisions initially took this to mean that officials 
must willfully accept or tacitly approve the private party’s actions. 
Courts have rejected that approach as overly restrictive. But what 
they have adopted in its place—a “willful blindness” test under which 
CAT applicants must show that officials would turn a blind eye to the 
torture they face—is also problematic. Under this standard, even 
where government officials take only half-hearted or patently 
inadequate steps to combat acts of privately-inflicted torture such as 
domestic violence, honor killings, gang violence, or mob attacks on 
LGBTQI people, courts frequently conclude that acquiescence has not 
been shown. As long as officials are doing something, the decisions 
reason, they are not willfully blind. 
This Article argues that willful blindness should not be the 
test for acquiescence. The term “acquiescence” is defined in a Senate 
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ratification understanding to require that a public official have 
awareness of the torturous activity and breach a legal responsibility 
to intervene to prevent it. This definition, which has been 
incorporated into U.S. law, makes clear that when officials are aware 
of torturous activity—and in most cases there is no doubt that a 
country’s government is aware of widespread patterns of abuse—
what matters is whether they breach their legal responsibility to take 
preventive action. 
Drawing on previously overlooked aspects of the history of the 
CAT’s drafting and U.S. ratification, this Article argues that officials 
acquiesce to torture if they fail to meet their legal responsibility 
under international law to take effective preventive measures. The 
State’s responsibility to exercise “due diligence” to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of torture by non-State actors 
is widely recognized under the CAT and other human rights treaties. 
The U.N. Committee Against Torture has found that when States fail 
to exercise due diligence, they enable private parties to commit acts of 
torture with impunity, and thereby acquiesce. That approach accords 
with how the U.S., during the treaty negotiations, originally defined 
“acquiescence” when it proposed adding the term to the CAT’s torture 
definition. It also fits in comfortably with the text and purpose of the 
treaty and its U.S. ratification understandings. 
The Article concludes by considering what a due diligence 
standard for acquiescence would look like in practice and addresses 
potential objections to its appropriateness and administrability. It 
also offers a proposal to amend the CAT regulations to clarify the 
acquiescence standard. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT)1 established an international regime designed to “make more 
effective the struggle against torture . . . throughout the world.”2 One 
key strand in its web of preventive measures is Article 3’s 
requirement that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”3 The United States played an active role in the treaty’s 
drafting,4 and, like most of the world’s countries, has ratified it.5 
Since the 1990s, when the U.S. began applying Article 3 in 
immigration proceedings, the CAT has offered the possibility of 
protection for non-citizens who would face atrocious harm if deported 
but cannot qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, the forms of 
                                                                                                  
1.  United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 
1987) [hereinafter CAT]. 
2.  Id. pmbl. 
3.  Id. art. 3(1). The French term refouler means to repulse or repel. See 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 180–82 (1993). In international 
refugee and human rights law, the term “non-refoulement” is frequently used to 
refer to the obligation of States not to return individuals to places where they will 
face danger. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & LEAH ZAMORE, THE ARC OF 
PROTECTION: REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME 60–68 (2019) 
(discussing the origins and development of the non-refoulement principle). 
4.  See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND 
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. 
REP. No. 101-30, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Report] (“Ratification is a natural 
follow-on to the active role the United States played in the negotiating process for 
the Convention”); 136 CONG. REC. 36, 196 (1990) (reflecting Senator Moynihan’s 
statement prior to ratification vote that the U.S. “has invested enormous 
resources in this convention. For 7 years our diplomats labored . . . [to make] its 
obligations concrete, meaningful, and, as never before, enforceable.”); see generally 
J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK 31–107 (1988) (providing a detailed account of 
the CAT’s drafting history with many references to the U.S. role). 
5.  The U.S. is among 171 ratifying countries. See Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/6XHZ-
HMU2] (listing States parties). 
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relief the U.S. provides to comply with U.N. treaties on refugees.6 
Asylum and withholding are available only to persons who face 
persecution because of their race, nationality, religion, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion.7 In addition, there are 
broad bars to asylum and (to a somewhat lesser degree) withholding 
that disqualify many otherwise eligible applicants based on criminal 
conduct, security risks, involvement in persecuting others, time spent 
in a third country, or applying more than a year after entry.8 
Protection under the CAT, in contrast, is absolute. The 
United States can never send a person to a place where they would 
face torture.9 It does not matter whether the torturer’s motivations 
                                                                                                  
6.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, adopted Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). In 1968, the U.S. ratified the Refugee Protocol, 
which incorporates and extends all the substantive provisions of the Convention. 
To bring U.S. law into conformity with these treaties, the Refugee Act of 1980 
created a statutory mechanism for granting asylum and broadened the scope of an 
already-existing provision that allowed immigration judges to grant withholding 
of removal. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (relevant 
provisions codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158, 1231(b)(3)); INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1987) (discussing Congress’ intent to 
conform U.S. law to the Protocol). Asylum provides a path to lawful permanent 
residence and citizenship. Withholding of removal prevents deportation to a 
specified country but confers fewer benefits and does not lead to a permanent 
status. See Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 30–32 (1st Cir. 2017) (detailing the 
differences). A grant of asylum is discretionary, however, in contrast with 
withholding, which must be awarded if the applicant meets the eligibility criteria. 
See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440–41, 443–44. Withholding requires proof 
that persecution is probable, while asylum requires only a showing of “well-
founded fear”—a reasonable possibility of persecution. Id. at 423, 438–40. 
7.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), (C). 
8.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2), (b)(2), 1231(b)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c), 
1208.4(a), 1208.16(d)(2). 
9.  International human rights law on torture allows no exceptions to the 
non-refoulement duty because torture “constitutes the most direct attack at the 
very essence of human dignity.” Walter Suntinger, The Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Looking Rather to Geneva than to Strasbourg?, 49 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. 
INT’L L. 203, 204 (1995). All of the major international and regional human rights 
instruments, going back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
proscribe torture. The prohibition has become part of customary international 
law, and is widely recognized as one of the few norms, together with the 
prohibitions of slavery and genocide, that has attained jus cogens status—a 
peremptory norm that admits of no exceptions and is binding on States, 
regardless of their consent. See Juan E. Méndez & Andra Nicolescu, Evolving 
Standards for Torture in International Law, in TORTURE AND ITS DEFINITION IN 
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relate to any of the five protected grounds for asylum. Torture 
inflicted to coerce extortion payments, extract information, or punish 
actual or imagined misdeeds can provide a basis for CAT relief.10 Nor 
do any eligibility bars apply.11 The CAT entered the U.S. immigration 
system in the 1990s as Congress was expanding the bars to asylum 
and withholding,12 and courts and agencies were restrictively 
interpreting the grounds on which those forms of relief could be 
                                                                                                  
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 215, 217 (Metin Başoğlu 
ed., 2017). 
10.  See Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(“Significantly, relief under the [CAT] does not require a nexus to specific 
statutory grounds.”). The CAT’s torture definition does require that severe pain or 
suffering be inflicted “for such purposes as” those appearing on a list so broad that 
it would cover just about any reason for deliberately inflicting severe pain, aside 
from a doctor performing a painful but necessary medical procedure. CAT, supra 
note 1, art. 1(1); see infra text accompanying notes 224–27 (discussing the CAT’s 
purpose requirement). 
11.  See Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 368 (B.I.A. 2002) (“An alien’s 
criminal convictions . . . , however serious, are not a bar to deferral of removal 
under the [CAT].”). Persons with serious criminal convictions, however, receive a 
more tenuous form of protection. The U.S. regulations created two types of CAT 
relief: withholding of removal under the CAT and deferral of removal. The 
substantive eligibility standards are identical, and both protect against removal to 
the country where the person would face torture. CAT withholding is available to 
applicants not subject to any of the statutory bars to a grant of withholding of 
removal; if a bar applies, only CAT deferral is available. See 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(c)(4). CAT deferral is more easily revoked if conditions in the applicant’s 
home country change, and in some circumstances, it allows for continued 
detention. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(c), (d). This Article uses the term “CAT relief” to 
refer to both varieties. 
12.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) expanded the list of “aggravated felonies” that bar a grant of 
asylum and frequently preclude withholding of removal as well. See Kristen B. 
Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty 
that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of 
Removal, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 533, 533–34 (1998) (giving examples of 
persons ineligible for asylum and withholding under IIRIRA for minor crimes, 
including a woman who forged a $19.53 check). A sequence of statutory changes 
also expanded the reach of terrorism-related bars, making them so broad that 
“[l]ending a bicycle to Nelson Mandela when the African National Congress was 
an outlawed anti-apartheid organization would have constituted material support 
to a terrorist organization.” Maryellen Fullerton, Terrorism, Torture, and Refugee 
Protection in the United States, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 4, 4, 16 (2011). 
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granted.13 Advocates and commentators at the time hailed the CAT’s 
bright promise as a viable alternative for asylum seekers.14 
Recent immigration court statistics underscore the CAT’s 
growing importance for those excluded by increasingly restrictive 
interpretations of asylum law. In response to a surge in Central 
American migrants fleeing gang violence, domestic violence, and 
femicide, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and U.S. Attorney 
General have issued a series of decisions making it harder for persons 
targeted by these types of violence to establish that their persecution 
fits into any of the five protected grounds.15 This forces asylum 
seekers and their lawyers to more frequently bring arguments under 
the CAT.16 The grant rate in immigration court for asylum and 
                                                                                                  
13.  See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992) (rejecting a 
claim that forced recruitment by a guerilla group constituted persecution based on 
political opinion); Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding 
that severe spousal abuse did not amount to persecution based on membership in 
a particular social group), vacated, id. at 906 (A.G. 2001), effectively reinstated in 
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 328–29 (A.G. 2018). 
14.  See, e.g., Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: A Viable Alternative for Asylum Seekers, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1773, 1773 (1997) (discussing how the CAT provides a new alternative method of 
litigating asylum cases); Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Convention Against 
Torture: A Viable Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 895, 900, 914 (2000) (discussing the significant relief that the CAT will 
provide to victims of domestic violence). 
15.  See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of 
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (both restrictively interpreting 
the “particular social group” ground in cases involving applicants facing 
retaliation for refusing to join or leaving a gang); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 320 
(stating that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang 
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”); 
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (A.G. 2019) (holding that harm inflicted 
based on the victim’s family ties, a common motivator for gang violence, generally 
will not amount to persecution based on social group membership). 
16.  See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Real Message of R-A-F-, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS 
ON IMMIGR. L. (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/3/1/the-
real-message-of-matter-of-r-a-f- [https://perma.cc/V4JM-M7MJ] (“CAT generally 
only comes into play where the applicant isn’t found eligible for asylum, 
something which is happening more frequently as the current administration 
churns out new bars and obstacles to eligibility.”); Steven H. Schulman, Judge 
Posner’s Road Map for Convention Against Torture Claims When Central 
American Governments Cannot Protect Citizens Against Gang Violence, 19 
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 297, 298 (2017) (explaining that 
the CAT “has become an increasingly important avenue for Central Americans 
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withholding claims fell from 56% in 2014 to 28% in 2020.17 For a 
growing proportion of asylum seekers, CAT relief provides the only 
path to protection.18  
Nonetheless, CAT claims rarely succeed. Over the most recent 
five-year period, immigration judges granted only about 5% of CAT 
applications that were decided on the merits.19 
The state responsibility requirement in the CAT’s definition 
of torture has been a major stumbling block for those seeking CAT 
protection. Article 1 of the CAT, which was carried over essentially 
verbatim into the U.S. regulations, defines torture as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
                                                                                                  
seeking protection” as a result of decisions restricting asylum for those fleeing 
gangs). 
17.  All years referenced in this paragraph are fiscal years, not calendar 
years. The combined grant rate for asylum and withholding of removal claims 
(counting only cases that resulted in a decision on the merits) was 56% in 2014, 
55% in 2015, 48% in 2016, 42% in 2017, 38% in 2018, 31% in 2019, and 28.4% in 
2020. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 27 (2019) (displaying data for FY 2014 to FY 
2018); Record Number of Asylum Cases in FY 2019, TRAC IMMIGR. (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/ [https://perma.cc/JSM4-98FL] 
(displaying data for FY 2019); Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, TRAC 
IMMIGR. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5RF-N7WG] (containing grant rate information for 2019 and 
2020). 
18.  From 2014 to 2018 (the last year for which published data on CAT 
grants in immigration court are available), the vast majority of CAT grants (over 
75%) were for CAT withholding rather than deferral of removal, which indicates 
that the bulk of those getting CAT relief were found ineligible for asylum and 
withholding of removal due to lack of nexus to a protected ground, and not 
because they were subject to one of the criminal, terrorist, or other bars to 
withholding. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS 
YEARBOOKS, FY 2018 at 30; FY 2017 at 30; FY 2016 at M1; Fiscal Year 2015 at 
M1; FY 2014 at M1; see also supra note 11 (explaining the withholding/deferral 
distinction in CAT relief). 
19.  The yearly figures (calculated from numbers of CAT grants and denials 
reported in EOIR’s Statistics Yearbooks, supra note 18) were 4.8% in 2014, 6.0% 
in 2015, 4.8% in 2016, 5.2% in 2017, and 4.8% in 2018. 
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based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.20 
Non-refoulement protection under Article 3 depends on showing that 
a person “would be in danger of being subjected to torture” within the 
meaning of that Article 1 definition.21 
Consider how the CAT’s torture definition applies to the kinds 
of cases most frequently heard in the immigration courts in recent 
years—those of individuals and families fleeing threats from gangs or 
drug cartels, domestic violence, or societal violence targeting women 
and LGBTQI people.22 In most such cases there is little doubt that the 
harm the applicant fears—brutal beatings, even more gruesome 
mistreatment, or death—is severe enough to amount to torture.23 Nor 
will it generally be a problem to establish that the pain or suffering 
will be inflicted intentionally and for a punitive, coercive, 
intimidating, information-extracting, or discriminatory purpose.24 
                                                                                                  
20.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (emphasis added and second sentence 
omitted); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (containing an essentially identical 
definition). 
21.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1)–(2), 
1208.18(a) (further defining eligibility for CAT relief). The United States 
interprets that standard to require proof that torture is “more likely than not” to 
occur. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(2), 136 
CONG. REC. 36,198–99 (1990) (establishing the U.S. understanding). The “more 
likely than not” standard mirrors the U.S. standard for withholding of removal. 
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984). 
22.   See, e.g., Laura Gottesdiener & John Washington, They’re Refugees, 
Fleeing Gang Violence and Domestic Abuse. Why Won’t the Trump Administration 
Let Them In?, THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/archive/trump-asylum-gangs-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/Y8EJ-
QKJF]. 
23.  See Monica Fonesi, Relief Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture: 
A Framework for Central American Gang Recruits and Former Gang Members to 
Fulfill the “Consent or Acquiescence” Requirement, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
308, 320 (2008) (noting that courts assessing CAT claims in gang-based cases 
have conceded the harm faced by applicants is severe enough to be considered 
torture). Some claims, of course, are denied because the adjudicator disbelieves 
the applicant’s story or finds the evidence insufficient to show that such harm is 
likely. 
24.  The intent requirement does stand as an obstacle to CAT relief in one 
class of cases: those involving people who would face imprisonment or 
institutionalization in their home country under atrocious conditions that result 
from lack of resources, poor management, or negligence. See Matter of J-R-G-P-, 
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The biggest obstacle, rather, is the torture definition’s requirement 
that pain or suffering be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity.”25 
For asylum and withholding, the refugee definition has long 
been interpreted to cover harms inflicted by private groups or 
individuals that a country’s government is unable or unwilling to 
control.26 But for conduct by non-State actors to qualify as “torture” 
within the meaning of the CAT, it must be shown that a public official 
would, at a minimum, acquiesce to the torturous activity. The U.S. 
regulations that implement the CAT in immigration proceedings 
provide a specific definition for the term “acquiescence” which is 
taken from one of the ratification understandings on which the 
Senate conditioned its consent to the treaty: 
Acquiescence of a public official requires that the 
public official, prior to the activity constituting 
torture, have awareness of such activity and 
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity.27 
The U.S. jurisprudence interpreting this standard is, put 
simply, a mess. The BIA and Attorney General, in early precedential 
decisions addressing torture inflicted by guerillas or criminal groups, 
held that “acquiescence” requires a showing that public officials are 
“willfully accepting” or providing “tacit support” to private actors’ 
                                                                                                  
27 I. & N. Dec. 482, 484–87 (B.I.A. 2018) (finding that severe pain and suffering 
caused by such detention conditions does not meet the CAT’s specific intent 
requirement); Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 299–302 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding 
that substandard detention conditions due to budgetary and management 
problems do not amount to “torture”). 
25.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (defining 
torture under the CAT). 
26.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining 
persecution to include actions “either by the government . . . or by persons or an 
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”); see also 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/ENG/REV.4 (1979, 
reissued 2019) (stating that serious discriminatory mistreatment inflicted by the 
local populace “can be considered as persecution . . . if the authorities refuse, or 
prove unable, to offer effective protection”). 
27.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d), 
136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990) (establishing the U.S. understanding stating the 
same). 
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torturous activities.28 Federal courts of appeals have uniformly 
rejected that interpretation, finding it contrary to clear indications in 
the drafting history of the U.S. acquiescence understanding that the 
word “awareness” was intended to encompass both actual knowledge 
and “willful blindness.”29 Officials may turn a blind eye to torture 
even if they don’t approve of it, the courts reason.30 
Most judicial decisions, however, either expressly or implicitly 
go a step further, treating “willful blindness” as the minimum 
necessary condition to establish acquiescence. In other words, unless 
an applicant can show that a public official is likely to be at least 
willfully blind to (even if not participating in, instigating, or 
consenting to) private acts of torture, courts will conclude that 
acquiescence has not been established, and the CAT claim must fail.31 
This Article argues that courts have made a conceptual error 
by conflating willful blindness with acquiescence. The treaty’s U.S. 
ratification history shows that willful blindness was merely intended 
to be an alternative way to establish official awareness of torturous 
activity. Once “awareness” is established—whether through actual 
knowledge or willful blindness—the focus should turn to the next 
question posed by the Senate understanding and regulation: is it 
likely that a public official will “breach his or her legal responsibility 
to intervene to prevent such activity?”32 While judicial opinions 
sometimes recite that language, they give it no content. None of the 
case law addresses where this legal responsibility comes from, or 
what it requires.33 The decisions thus fail to consider whether officials 
                                                                                                  
28.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (stating that to 
show acquiescence an applicant must demonstrate that officials are “willfully 
accepting” of the activity in question); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280 
(A.G. 2002) (denying CAT relief where there was no showing that the group the 
applicant feared had “tacit support” from the government). 
29.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9; see also infra Section I.A (tracing the 
construction of “willful blindness” in this context). 
30.  For discussion of this case law, see infra Section I.C. 
31.  See infra Section I.D. 
32.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The regulation is awkwardly phrased in the 
present tense, but when the torture definition is applied in the context of removal 
proceedings, the inquiry will always be prospective, asking whether it is probable 
that a public official who has knowledge of, or is willfully blind to, the torturous 
activity the CAT applicant fears will breach a legal responsibility to take 
preventive action.  
33.  Even the Second Circuit, the only appellate tribunal that has been 
careful to emphasize that “willful blindness” bears only on awareness and breach 
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have legal obligations—whether imposed by the CAT and other 
international law or the domestic law of the officials’ own country—
that extend beyond a duty not to be “willfully blind” to torture. 
A common CAT scenario shows why it matters that courts 
have focused on “willful blindness” without considering other ways in 
which officials may breach their legal responsibility. A country’s 
government is aware—in fact, has actual knowledge of—a widespread 
problem of torturous activity by non-State actors.34 It may be men 
domestically abusing their spouses or partners; drug cartels 
unleashing brutal violence on those who disobey them; families 
threatening women with honor killings; or mobs physically attacking 
LGBTQI people. The country’s government is not completely 
indifferent to the problem—it recognizes the need to protect at-risk 
groups and punish the perpetrators and has taken some preventive 
and remedial measures—but its actions are woefully insufficient and 
largely ineffectual. Corruption, indifference, or outright hostility by 
some law enforcement officials, as well as failures at higher levels of 
government to develop effective policies and allocate adequate 
resources all may contribute to effective impunity for perpetrators 
and an absence of effective protection for victims.35 
When the State’s response to torturous conduct is assessed 
under a willful blindness standard, it is all too easy for immigration 
judges and reviewing courts to find no acquiescence in situations like 
these. Courts frequently conclude that officials’ willingness to do 
                                                                                                  
of legal responsibility is a distinct inquiry, fails to offer any guidance in its 
decisions on the source and scope of the legal responsibility to prevent torture. See 
infra notes 99–103, 122. 
34.  Courts generally agree that to establish “awareness,” it is not necessary 
to show that a public official has knowledge of the individual CAT applicant’s 
specific situation; “instead, it is sufficient that the public official is aware that 
torture of the sort feared by the applicant occurs.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 
1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing two earlier decisions in agreement); see also 
Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 2017) (similar statement); Matter 
of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1313 (B.I.A. 2000) (stating that the CAT applicant’s 
burden was to prove that “officials acquiesce to the types of activities that the 
respondent fears he would suffer at the hands of the guerillas”). 
35.  See, e.g., Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr, 954 F.3d 813, 816–18 (5th Cir. 
2020) (describing the deterioration of protections against gender-based violence in 
Honduras since its 2009 coup, including governmental failure to effectively 
implement legislation and provide adequate resources for preventive and 
protective programs, and gender discrimination in the justice system, all of which 
contributed to a doubling of homicides of women). 
750 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
something shows that they are not willfully blind to torture.36 The 
negligence of public officials—the State’s failure to take necessary 
and reasonable steps to combat torture of the type the applicant 
faces—is hard to fit into the willful blindness box. 
Shifting the focus away from “willful blindness” and toward 
the second part of the regulatory test—whether officials who are 
aware of the abuses “thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity”—would, this Article contends, 
provide a path to a more coherent jurisprudence that is truer to the 
CAT’s purposes, and would also bring U.S. case law into harmony 
with the prevailing international understanding of the CAT and other 
treaties prohibiting torture. The legal responsibility of public officials 
to intervene to prevent torturous activity derives from international 
law as well as domestic legislation. U.N. treaty bodies and regional 
human rights courts have reached a strong consensus that, under the 
CAT and other human rights treaties, States have a legal 
responsibility to exercise “due diligence” to prevent, investigate, 
prosecute, and punish acts of torture by non-State actors.37 The U.N. 
Committee Against Torture has found that when States fail to 
exercise due diligence, they enable private parties to commit acts of 
torture with impunity and thereby acquiesce, making the State 
responsible under the CAT’s torture definition.38 A due diligence 
approach to CAT acquiescence does not sweep quite as broadly as the 
“unable or unwilling to control” standard, derived from refugee 
treaties, that is used for asylum and withholding of removal.39 But it 
is considerably more protective than the current willful-blindness-
based jurisprudence and provides an interpretation of acquiescence 
that accords with the CAT’s text and purpose and the U.S. 
ratification understandings. 
In developing these ideas, this Article proceeds as follows. 
Part I traces the origins of the “willful blindness” approach and the 
path of agency and judicial interpretation that brought it to center 
stage. It then examines the incoherence of the CAT case law that 
                                                                                                  
36.  See infra Section I.D. 
37.  See infra Section II.A. 
38.  U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation 
of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter “Gen. Cmt. 2”]. The Committee Against Torture, which consists of ten 
human rights experts elected by the States parties to the CAT, is charged with 
monitoring compliance with the treaty. See CAT, supra note 1, arts. 17–24. 
39.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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rests on “willful blindness,” and its inadequacy in addressing 
situations where officials do little to protect a person at risk of 
torture, or systematically fail to take measures needed to curb a 
widespread problem of torturous violence. 
Part II examines how international law has defined the scope 
of State officials’ legal responsibility to intervene to prevent torture. 
It traces the development of the “due diligence” standard and 
explains why this approach is warranted as a matter of treaty 
interpretation. This Part also considers evidence from the CAT’s 
drafting history, largely overlooked in prior scholarship, which shows 
that “acquiescence” made its way into the CAT via a U.S. proposal 
that expressly tied the concept to a treaty-based obligation on the 
part of officials to take all appropriate measures within their power to 
prevent torturous conduct. 
Part III examines the CAT’s ratification and implementation 
history in the U.S. It concludes that the understanding of 
acquiescence adopted by the Senate when it ratified the treaty 
requires looking to all applicable sources of legal obligation, 
international as well as domestic, when assessing whether officials 
have breached their legal responsibility to prevent torture. Tellingly, 
when the immigration agencies began to apply the CAT in the 1990s, 
a memo from the INS General Counsel explained that the reference 
to “legal responsibility” in the Senate understanding included 
obligations under international law. 
Part IV considers what a due diligence standard for 
acquiescence would look like in practice and addresses some potential 
objections to its appropriateness and administrability. It also contains 
a proposal to amend the CAT regulations to clarify the meaning of 
acquiescence. 
I. THE TRAVELS AND TRAVAILS OF “WILLFUL BLINDNESS” AS THE 
STANDARD FOR ACQUIESCENCE IN U.S. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
CAT 
A. How “Willful Blindness” Entered the Picture 
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CAT on December 
10, 1984,40 and the treaty entered into force in 1987, after twenty 
                                                                                                  
40.  G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
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States had ratified it.41 The United States initiated its ratification 
process in 1988, when President Reagan signed the CAT and 
forwarded it to the Senate for its advice and consent.42 The Reagan 
Administration put forward nineteen proposed conditions on U.S. 
ratification, in the form of four reservations, nine understandings, 
and four declarations.43 Five of the proposed understandings 
concerned the CAT’s definition of “torture,” and one specifically 
addressed the meaning of the term “acquiescence.”44 
The Reagan Administration’s proposed conditions drew 
criticism from human rights groups, the American Bar Association, 
and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 
undermining the CAT’s efficacy and sending a message that the 
United States was not seriously committed to the fight against 
torture. In 1989, the new George H.W. Bush Administration 
negotiated with those groups, and in December it submitted a smaller 
and revised package of conditions, which included a modified version 
of the “acquiescence” understanding.45 In July 1990, the Senate 
                                                                                                  
41.  See CAT, supra note 1, art. 27 (providing that the treaty would enter 
into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the twentieth State 
instrument of ratification or accession with the U.N. Secretary General); see also 
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 109–10 (listing the ratifications that led to 
the treaty’s entry into force). 
42.  Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Convention Against Torture, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20 (1988) [hereinafter 
President’s Transmittal]. 
43.  Id. at vi, 1–18; see also Senate Report, supra note 4, at 7, 11–28 (1990) 
(reprinting the summary and analysis transmitted by the Reagan Administration 
that contained its proposed conditions). Reservations are intended to alter and 
limit U.S. obligations under a treaty, while understandings announce how the 
U.S. intends to interpret a provision in a manner it views as consistent with 
treaty requirements. Declarations are statements of intention regarding general 
aspects of implementing the treaty. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 416–
23, 430–32 (2000); see also David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the 
Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United States, 15 NOVA L. 
REV. 449, 451–52 n.8 (1991) (explaining the distinctions of reservations, 
understandings, and declarations). 
44.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 3–5; see also Senate Report, 
supra note 4, at 13–15 (reprinting the Reagan Administration’s discussion of its 
“torture” understandings). 
45.  See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,193 (1990) (statement of Sen. Pell); Senate 
Report, supra note 4, at 4, 7–8, 35–38 (listing the Bush Administration 
conditions); Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 101-718, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter 
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Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of the treaty with the 
Bush Administration’s proposed conditions,46 and the full Senate gave 
its advice and consent on October 30, 1990.47 The CAT entered into 
force for the United States on November 20, 1994, thirty days after 
President Bill Clinton deposited an instrument of ratification with 
the U.N. Secretary-General.48 
It took several more years to incorporate the CAT’s non-
refoulement requirement into domestic U.S. law. As part of the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), 
Congress directed agency heads to “prescribe regulations to 
implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the 
[CAT], subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations and 
provisos” in the Senate ratification resolution.49 In 1999, the Justice 
Department promulgated regulations establishing standards and 
procedures for the adjudication of CAT claims by immigration 
                                                                                                  
Senate Hearing], at 1 (statement of Sen. Pell), 8–9 (prepared statement of State 
Department Legal Advisor Abraham D. Sofaer), 45 (statement of Winston Nagan, 
Chair, Amnesty International USA); see also Peder van W. Magee, The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: The Bush Administration's Stance on Torture, 25 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 807, 816 n.80 (1992) (discussing Sen. Pell’s pivotal role 
in securing changes). 
46.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 3, 29–31. 
47.  136 Cong. Rec. 36,198–99 (1990). Some additional changes to the Bush 
conditions were made via a floor amendment were worked out between Senator 
Clairborne Pell, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, and Senator 
Jesse Helms, the ranking Republican member. No change was made to the 
“acquiescence” understanding. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,195–96 (1990). 
48.  Declarations and Reservations Made Upon Ratification, Accession, or 
Succession [United States], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994); see also CAT, supra 
note 1, arts. 25(2), 27(2) (providing that the CAT enters into force for a country 
thirty days after depositing its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-
General). When submitting the CAT to Congress, the Executive Branch made 
clear that it did not intend to deposit an instrument of ratification until 
legislation was enacted to implement Article 5, which required extending U.S. 
criminal jurisdiction to cover acts of torture committed by U.S. nationals abroad 
and acts of torture committed abroad by non-U.S. nationals later found in the 
United States. See President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 9–10; Senate 
Hearing, supra note 45, at 12, 40–41 (prepared statement and hearing testimony 
of Abraham D. Sofaer). That legislation, known as the Torture Act, was not 
enacted until 1994. Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (1994), codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2340, 2340A. 
49.  FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, tit. XXII, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 
2681-822 (1998) (codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 
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judges.50 The Senate’s “acquiescence” understanding is included in 
the regulations’ definition of torture.51 
The acquiescence understanding in the Reagan 
Administration’s original package of proposed conditions read as 
follows: 
The United States understands that the term 
“acquiescence” requires that the public official, prior 
to the activity constituting torture, have knowledge of 
such activity and thereafter breach his legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.52 
The State Department analysis that accompanied the President’s 
transmittal of the treaty indicated that this understanding, along 
with several others relating to Article 1’s torture definition, was 
“intended to guard against the improper application of the 
Convention” in ways that could threaten “U.S. law enforcement 
interests.”53 The concern, a State Department official later wrote, was 
that because the CAT contemplates criminal prosecution of those 
implicated in torture, the definition’s terms needed to be delineated 
with “clarity and precision” to meet constitutional standards.54  
With that concern in mind, the Administration’s analysis 
stated: “[I]n our view, a public official may be deemed to ‘acquiesce’ in 
a private act of torture only if the act is performed with his 
knowledge and the public official has a legal duty to intervene to 
prevent such activity.”55 The Administration also justified its 
acquiescence understanding as consistent with the CAT’s limitation 
of its scope to “torture that occurs in the context of governmental 
                                                                                                  
50.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, Regulations Concerning the Convention 
Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) [hereinafter CAT Regulations], 
now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16–18. 
51.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The Justice Department’s commentary notes 
that the regulatory definition of torture “is drawn directly from the language of 
the Convention, the language of the reservations, understandings and 
declarations contained in the Senate resolution ratifying the Convention, or from 
ratification history.” CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8482. 
52.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5. 
53.  Id. at 4. 
54.  Stewart, supra note 43, at 449, 455–56; see also Senate Hearing, supra 
note 45, at 14 (testimony by Justice Department official Mark Richard explaining 
that the “acquiescence” understanding was “necessary to ensure that Article 1 
complies with the due process requirements of the Constitution”). 
55.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 4. 
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authority, excluding torture that occurs as a wholly private act.”56 
But, the explicit reference to “private act[s]” of torture, as well as the 
wording of the understanding itself,57 makes clear that this reference 
to the “context of governmental authority” was intended to include 
situations where private actors engage in torturous activity and an 
official who knows about it breaches a legal duty to take preventive 
action. 
The Bush Administration’s revised reservations, 
understandings, and declarations package retained the Reagan 
“acquiescence” understanding with one modification: it changed the 
word “knowledge” to “awareness.” The State Department, in its letter 
transmitting the revised conditions to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, explained that this change was made “to make it clearer 
that both actual knowledge and willful blindness fall within the 
meaning of acquiescence.”58 As a Justice Department official testified 
at the Senate hearing on the CAT, the change reflected the fact that 
“knowledge under our law includes not only actual knowledge . . . but 
also willful blindness,” and was designed to ensure that an official 
with “a duty to prevent the misconduct” would not be able to evade 
                                                                                                  
56.  Id. at 4. This language was later echoed in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee report approving the CAT, see Senate Report, supra note 4, 
at 6, and in the Justice Department’s commentary to the implementing 
regulations. CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8483. The Reagan State 
Department’s analysis went on to draw an analogy to the “under color of law” 
standard of civil rights statues. The phrase “under color of law” was incorporated 
into two later statutes criminalizing and providing civil remedies for certain acts 
of torture but does not appear in the Senate CAT understandings or U.S. 
immigration regulations. See infra Part III. 
57.  The phrase “activity constituting torture” (both in the original Reagan 
Administration version and the revised version ultimately accepted by the Senate) 
must be understood as referring to the first part of the CAT Article 1 definition of 
torture, which defines the act—intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for 
certain purposes—and not the definition’s final clause, which specifies the 
circumstances in which the State is deemed responsible for such an act (“when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted . . . with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official”). Otherwise, the understanding would be circular; it would be saying that 
public officials cannot acquiesce to torturous activity unless they know the 
activity is occurring with the acquiescence of public officials. 
58.  Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, 
Dep’t of State, to Sen. Pell (Dec. 10, 1989) (reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 
4, at 35–36). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, endorsing the revised 
understanding in its report, similarly stated that its purpose “is to make it clear 
that both actual knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the definition of the 
term ‘acquiescence’ in article 1.” Id. at 9. 
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responsibility “by deliberately clos[ing] his eyes to what would 
otherwise have been obvious to him.”59 When the Foreign Relations 
Committee favorably reported the treaty to the Senate, it endorsed 
the Administration’s explanation of the revised understanding’s 
objective.60 
The phrase “willful blindness” thus made its way into the 
ratification history as a gloss on the meaning of the word 
“awareness.” Its function is to provide another way to show that 
public officials “have awareness” of activity amounting to torture, 
even if their actual knowledge cannot be established. In most cases 
involving private torture, however, establishing that officials have 
knowledge is not problematic: the authorities are well aware that 
violence of the sort the applicant fears—whether it be gender-based 
violence, genital cutting, anti-gay attacks, or violent retaliation by 
gangs, guerillas or cartels—is widespread and ongoing.61 
Once it is shown that officials have the requisite awareness, 
the Senate understanding is clear that the test for “acquiescence” 
turns on how they respond. If officials “breach [their] legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity,”62 they are 
acquiescing. Nothing in the ratification history suggests that a 
showing of “willful blindness” is needed to establish that officials 
have breached their legal responsibility. 
B. The “Willful Acceptance” Standard Emerges 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the tribunal 
established by the Attorney General to decide appeals from 
immigration judge decisions,63 issued Matter of S-V-,64 its first 
                                                                                                  
59.  Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 14 (testimony by Mark Richard, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., Dep’t of Just.). 
60.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9 (“The purpose of this condition is to 
make it clear that both actual knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the 
definition of the term ‘acquiescence’ in [A]rticle 1.”). 
61.  Courts generally agree that “awareness” requires only a showing that 
public officials are aware that torture of the sort the applicant fears occurs; there 
is no need to show that an official is aware of the CAT applicant’s specific 
situation. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
62.  Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d), 136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (incorporating the Senate understanding). 
63.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Attorney 
General to issue regulations and make “controlling” rulings “with respect to all 
questions of law” arising under immigration statutes. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (g). 
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precedential opinion construing the CAT, in May 2000, about a year 
after the CAT immigration regulations went into effect.65 The case 
reviewed a motion to reopen a removal order submitted by a man who 
contended that if removed to Colombia he would be kidnapped by 
guerillas and held in inhuman conditions amounting to torture.66 The 
BIA began its analysis by quoting the U.S. definition of 
“acquiescence,” and noting that its drafting history indicates that 
either actual knowledge or willful blindness can suffice to establish 
officials’ “awareness” of torturous activity.67 It then stressed that 
“[t]he Senate’s inclusion of this definition of acquiescence in its 
understandings” modified the legal effect of the treaty with regard to 
                                                                                                  
The Attorney General has delegated to the BIA the authority to issue legal rulings 
in appeals from immigration judge decisions and has authorized the BIA to 
designate selected decisions as precedents binding on immigration judges 
nationwide. The Attorney General, however, may review and modify or overrule 
any decision of the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (d)(3)(ii), (g), (h). Under 
administrative law principles, courts generally accord deference to precedential 
decisions of the BIA and Attorney General interpreting ambiguous provisions in 
the statutes they administer, provided those interpretations are reasonable. See 
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (holding that the BIA’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the asylum statute was entitled to 
judicial deference); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (establishing the level of deference afforded to 
administrative interpretations of statutes, widely known as ‘Chevron deference’). 
64.  22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (B.I.A. 2000) (en banc). 
65.  Although the treaty took effect for the U.S. in November 1994, the BIA 
had found that the immigration courts lacked jurisdiction to award CAT relief 
until legislation implementing it in immigration proceedings was enacted. Matter 
of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 257–60 (B.I.A. 1998). To avoid violating the treaty 
during this period, the INS (which functioned as prosecutor in removal cases) had 
adopted a “pre-regulatory administrative process” under which, after the 
completion of removal proceedings but prior to executing an order of removal, the 
agency would consider whether removing the person to a particular country would 
violate Article 3 of the CAT and refrain from removing the person if it concluded 
that was the case. See CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8479. 
66.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1307. The respondent also raised a 
claim for withholding of removal, which the BIA rejected, finding he was 
disqualified by a robbery conviction that triggered the “particularly serious crime” 
bar to withholding, and also because he had not shown that he was likely to be 
harmed in Colombia on account of his political opinion, social group membership, 
or any other protected ground. Id. at 1308–10. 
67.  Id. at 1312. The BIA also drew a link between the Senate’s 
acquiescence understanding and statements in the ratification history that “only 
acts that occur in the context of governmental authority” fall within the CAT’s 
definition of torture. Id. The BIA appeared to accept that such a context is present 
if the requirements of the Senate understanding are met. 
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acquiescence, limiting it to the confines of that definition.68 But then, 
inexplicably, rather than looking to the Senate’s definition, the BIA 
proceeded to ignore it. Instead, relying on one dictionary definition, it 
found that acquiescence means “silent or passive assent.”69 From this 
it inferred that the respondent was required to “demonstrate that 
Colombian officials are willfully accepting of the guerillas’ torturous 
activities.”70 
The BIA claimed to find support for this approach in the U.N. 
Committee Against Torture’s interpretation of the CAT, citing its 
1998 ruling in the case of a Peruvian national who objected to being 
deported from Sweden because she feared torture from both the 
Peruvian government and Sendero Luminoso, a terrorist group.71 The 
Committee noted that Article 3 does not prohibit expelling a person 
who would face torture “inflicted by a non-governmental entity, 
without the consent or acquiescence of the Government.”72 This 
actually afforded no support for the BIA’s interpretation of 
acquiescence, because the Committee’s rationale for rejecting the 
claim was that the complainant had not established a “real and 
personal risk” of being tortured, and it never addressed whether the 
facts established “acquiescence” or what that term means.73 
                                                                                                  
68.  Id. This was a puzzling statement, given that there is nothing in the 
U.S. “acquiescence” definition to suggest it is more restrictive than the meaning of 
the word as used in the treaty; if anything, it might be broader, as one of the 
dissenting BIA members pointed out. Id. at 1318 (Rosenberg, dissenting). The 
BIA’s understanding of “understandings” was also off-base; an understanding, as 
opposed to a reservation, is viewed by the United States as consistent with, not 
modifying, its treaty obligations. See Stewart, supra note 43, at 451–52 n.8. 
69.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1312 (citing THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL 
DICTIONARY 17 (3d ed. 1955)). 
70.  Id. Interpreting the term otherwise, the BIA added, “would be to 
misconstrue the meaning of ‘acquiescence.’” Id. 
71.  Id. at 1312–13 (citing G.R.B. v. Sweden, No. 83/1997, Committee 
Against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (1998)). In another section of its 
opinion the BIA also looked to the Committee’s jurisprudence when addressing 
evidentiary standards for proving a person is in danger of torture. Id. at 1313. 
72.  G.R.B., ¶ 6.5. 
73.  Id. ¶ 6.6. Sweden, in its submission to the Committee, argued that the 
complainant had not established a real risk of facing torture from Sendero 
Luminoso because any such risk would be “of local character and the 
[complainant] could therefore secure her safety by moving within the country.” Id. 
¶¶ 4.14–15. See Robert McCorquodale & Rebecca LaForgia, Taking Off the 
Blindfolds: Torture by Non-State Actors, 1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 209–10 (2001) 
(discussing G.R.B. and explaining that the Committee did not address whether 
State acquiescence had been shown). 
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The BIA contrasted its newly minted “willful acceptance” 
standard with the standard applied in asylum cases, where it is 
enough to demonstrate that the government is “unable to control” 
nongovernmental persecutors.74 The acquiescence standard, it 
emphasized, requires the applicant to “do more than show that the 
officials are aware of the activity constituting torture but are 
powerless to stop it.”75 The BIA concluded that the record showed the 
Colombian government “actively, although to date unsuccessfully, 
combats the guerillas” and thus failed to establish that the 
government’s “failure to protect its citizens is the result of deliberate 
acceptance of the guerillas’ activities.”76 
Two years after Matter of S-V-, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft issued a precedential opinion reaffirming “willful 
acceptance” as the test for acquiescence. The decision, Matter of  
Y-L-,77 was primarily aimed at overruling BIA precedents that found 
low-level drug offenders eligible for withholding of removal. After 
laying out a new standard ensuring that virtually all drug 
convictions, regardless of sentence, would trigger the “particularly 
serious crime” bar to withholding,78 the remaining issue was whether 
the three respondents, who feared violent retaliation from Haitian 
death squads and Jamaican and Dominican drug trafficking groups, 
qualified for CAT deferral of removal.79 In finding that none of them 
had shown that the harm they feared would occur with government 
acquiescence, the Attorney General explicitly endorsed Matter of  
S-V-’s holding, characterizing its “willful acceptance” test as requiring 
a showing of “government-sanctioned atrocities” that occur with the 
                                                                                                  
74.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1312–13. 
75.  Id. at 1312. 
76.  Id. at 1313. Four BIA members took issue with the majority’s approach 
in dissenting or concurring opinions. Two opinions argued that because the 
guerillas exercised political power and controlled territory, they might themselves 
qualify as “public official[s] or other persons acting in an official capacity” within 
the meaning of article 1 of the CAT. They pointed to a recent decision of the U.N. 
Committee Against Torture finding that warring factions in Somalia were de facto 
state actors for purposes of the torture definition. Id. at 1314–15 (Villageliu, 
concurring), 1316–17 (Schmidt, concurring and dissenting) (citing Elmi v. 
Australia, No. 120/1998, Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999)). Another dissenter pointed to “willful blindness” as 
a possible way to show that state officials acquiesce to torture even if they oppose 
it. Id. at 1318 (Rosenberg, dissenting). 
77.  Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280 (A.G. 2002). 
78.  Id. at 273–78. 
79.  Id. at 279–85. 
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“tacit support” or “consent or approval” of authoritative government 
officials.80 
The willful acceptance standard has two glaring logical flaws. 
The first is that it disregards the specific definition of acquiescence in 
the U.S. ratification understanding, which indicates that 
acquiescence exists if officials have actual or constructive knowledge 
of torturous conduct and thereafter breach a legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent it. The mental stance of officials towards the 
torture—whether they approve, support, or accept it—has no intrinsic 
bearing on those questions. What really needed explication was the 
definition’s “legal responsibility” language: where does that legal duty 
come from, and what is its scope? The BIA and Attorney General 
evaded those key questions by reading “acquiescence” to conform to a 
dictionary definition rather than the definition laid out in the Senate 
understanding and U.S. regulation. As a matter of statutory 
construction, it is axiomatic that when a law expressly defines a term, 
the statutory definition takes precedence over the word’s “ordinary 
meaning.”81 
A second problem is that even under an ordinary meaning 
approach, the word “acquiescence” has common meanings extending 
well beyond the BIA’s “silent or passive assent” definition.82 
Acquiescence also means to reluctantly give in to something, even if 
one opposes it.83 In this sense, officials who fail to do what is legally 
                                                                                                  
80.  See id. at 280, 283, 285. 
81.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW 
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 74–75 (2016); see also ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 225–33 (2012) (discussing the interpretive canon that a specific definition 
provided by the legislature takes precedence over dictionary definitions of a term). 
Although the acquiescence definition is contained in an agency regulation, it has 
the force of a statute. Congress, in FARRA, mandated that the agency adopt 
implementing regulations for the CAT that included the understandings and 
other conditions set out in the Senate’s resolution of ratification. See supra note 
49 and accompanying text; see also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress clearly intended that agency regulations would 
apply the Senate acquiescence understanding). 
82.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000). 
83.  Dictionary definitions of acquiescence include: “passive assent because 
of inability or unwillingness to oppose: I acquiesced in their decision despite my 
misgivings.” Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1195 n.8 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)), and “[t]he quality or 
condition of accepting or complying with something passively or reluctantly;” 
Acquiescence definition 2.b, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/ 
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required of them to prevent and suppress acts of torture can be said 
to acquiesce to that conduct.84 Moreover, as Patricia Freshwater 
noted in an astute early commentary on the U.S. acquiescence 
standard, the CAT’s torture definition refers to the “consent or 
acquiescence” of a public official. Acquiescence therefore must be 
meant to cover something beyond what is conveyed by the word 
“consent.” The BIA’s standard for acquiescence, however, merely 
describes ways in which officials may consent to acts of torture, 
rendering the word “acquiescence” redundant.85 
The problems with the BIA’s standard had nothing to do with 
the concept of willful blindness. The BIA understood that “awareness” 
included willful blindness as well as actual knowledge. It was setting 
out a test for acquiescence as a whole, for which, under the Senate 
understanding, “awareness” is only the first step. Where the BIA 
went astray was in disregarding the “breach [of] legal responsibility” 
language in the Senate understanding and conflating acquiescence 
with consent. 
But as federal appeals courts began to review the agency’s 
approach, “willful blindness” took center stage. 
                                                                                                  
view/Entry/1718?redirectedFrom=acquiescence#eid [https://perma.cc/Y68A-
UU7K]. 
84.  See C.W. WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT 446 (2009) (reviewing dictionary definitions of 
“acquiescence” and concluding that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word implies 
the indirect involvement of the State in the act of torture, most likely in the form 
of an omission,” and therefore “when the State refrains from acting where it 
should have acted, it can be held responsible”). 
85.  Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the 
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the 
Torture of its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 597–98 (2005); see also William 
Paul Simmons, Liability of Secondary Actors Under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding 
and Abetting and Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the Femicides of 
Ciudad Juarez, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 88, 124 (2007) (observing that the 
inclusion of both “consent” and “acquiescence” shows that the terms were not 
meant to be synonymous). The State Department’s Legal Advisor, testifying 
before the Senate in support of ratification, likewise indicated that acquiescence 
covers more than official support by referring to torture that occurs “with the 
support or acquiescence of government officials.” Senate Hearing, supra note 45, 
at 4, 7 (testimony and prepared statement of Abraham Sofaer). 
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C. “Willful Blindness” Takes Over 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2003 decision in Zheng v. Ashcroft86 was 
the first and most influential in a series of federal appeals court 
decisions rejecting the “willful acceptance” test.87 Zheng was 
smuggled into the United States by members of a Chinese criminal 
syndicate called “snakeheads.” He testified against his smugglers in a 
criminal proceeding and as a result feared that the organization 
would torture and kill him if he returned to China.88 In his 
immigration proceedings, Zheng presented evidence that local 
officials in his province were connected to the smugglers and accepted 
bribes from them, and thus were unlikely to offer him any 
protection.89 An immigration judge granted relief under the CAT,90 
but the BIA reversed. Relying on Matter of S-V-, the BIA ruled that 
the evidence, even if it showed that Chinese officials knew about and 
did not interfere with the snakeheads’ smuggling operations, failed to 
establish that officials willfully accepted their torturous activities.91 
The Ninth Circuit opinion reviewed the drafting history of the 
Senate acquiescence understanding, emphasizing that “knowledge” 
was replaced with “awareness” to clarify that both actual knowledge 
and willful blindness are covered.92 From this it reasoned that the 
BIA, in adding a requirement that officials willfully accept torture, 
contravened Congress’s clear intent.93 Finding nothing in the 
ratification understandings “to suggest that anything more than 
awareness is required,” the court concluded that “[t]he correct inquiry 
as intended by the Senate is whether a respondent can show that 
public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture of their 
                                                                                                  
86.  332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). 
87.  An earlier decision by the Fifth Circuit had stated that “willful 
blindness” was sufficient to prove acquiescence and upheld a denial of CAT relief 
because the applicant had not shown that officials “would turn a blind eye” to the 
torture he feared, but the court in that case saw no conflict with the BIA’s “willful 
acceptance” standard and cited Matter of S-V- approvingly. Ontunez-Tursios v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2002). 
88.  Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1190. 
89.  Id. at 1188–91. There was also evidence that the Chinese government 
refused to acknowledge the snakeheads’ existence and would be unlikely to 
intercede because doing so would amount to an admission that they pose a 
problem. Id. at 1189 n.5. 
90.  Id. at 1192. 
91.  Id. at 1191–92. 
92.  Id. at 1192–93. 
93.  Id. at 1194–96. 
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citizens by third parties, or . . . would ‘turn a blind eye to torture.’’94 
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to determine 
whether Zheng’s evidence established acquiescence under the willful 
blindness test.95   
The Ninth Circuit was right to reject the BIA’s “willful 
acceptance” test as impermissibly restrictive. But there is a blind spot 
in Zheng’s reasoning that, ironically, mirrored a central flaw of the 
BIA’s approach by ignoring half of the Senate’s definition of 
acquiescence. Early in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
acquiescence regulation requires that an official “have awareness” of 
torturous activity and then breach a legal responsibility to intervene 
to prevent it.96 But the rest of the opinion lost sight of the second part 
of that test entirely, stating repeatedly that awareness in the form of 
willful blindness is all that is required to establish acquiescence.97 
It may be that the Ninth Circuit took the view that officials 
who turn a blind eye to torture not only “have awareness” but are also 
necessarily breaching a legal responsibility to take preventive action, 
without excluding the possibility that an inadequate (although not 
willfully blind) response could also constitute a breach of legal duty. 
But the court offered no explanation along these lines. In declaring 
that the “correct inquiry” for acquiescence is whether public officials 
turn a blind eye to torturous conduct,98 Zheng suggested that willful 
blindness is not merely another way to establish the “awareness” 
element, but the test for acquiescence as a whole—and thus necessary 
in order to establish a breach of legal responsibility. 
A year after Zheng, the Second Circuit, in Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft,99 joined the Ninth Circuit in rejecting the agency’s “willful 
acceptance” standard. The Second Circuit fixated less on “willful 
blindness” and avoided suggesting that it is a stand-alone test for 
acquiescence. Instead, echoing the Senate understanding, the court 
held that “[i]n terms of state action, torture requires only that 
government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an act and 
                                                                                                  
94.  Id. at 1196 (quoting Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355 
(5th Cir. 2002)). 
95.  Id. at 1197. 
96.  Id. at 1194 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)). 
97.  Id. at 1189, 1194, 1196. 
98.  Id. at 1196; see also id. at 1194–95 (citing Ontunez-Tursios, at 354-55). 
99.  361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.”100 The BIA 
and Attorney General, the Second Circuit found, erred in creating an 
additional requirement of “consent or approval.”101 It noted that such 
a requirement would have been consistent with the original Swedish 
draft of the CAT, which applied only to torture “by or at the 
instigation of” state officials, but the addition of the word 
“acquiescence” to the torture definition—a change made at the behest 
of the U.S. during the treaty negotiations—showed that official assent 
is not needed.102 
Applying the Senate understanding’s two-part test, the 
Second Circuit held that the record compelled an acquiescence 
finding. The BIA had conceded that Khouzam, who was suspected of a 
murder in Egypt, would face extreme physical abuse in police 
custody, but deemed it not to be torture because it would be inflicted 
by rogue officers acting in a “private” capacity, without the approval 
of Egyptian officials. The Second Circuit found that even if the police 
officers could be said to be acting in a non-official capacity (which the 
court doubted), the evidence established that Egyptian police 
routinely tortured suspects to extract confessions, which “suppl[ied] 
ample evidence that higher-level officials either know of the torture 
or remain willfully blind to the torture and breach their legal 
responsibility to prevent it.”103 The Khouzam court did not comment 
on the source or scope of that legal responsibility, presumably finding 
it obvious that law enforcement officials have some sort of legal 
obligation not to allow their subordinates to engage in torture. 
A third extensively reasoned opinion rejecting the agency 
standard was issued by the Third Circuit in 2007. Silva-Rengifo v. 
Attorney General104 involved a CAT claim by a long-term U.S. resident 
facing removal for a drug conviction who alleged he would be tortured 
by criminal groups in Colombia. The Third Circuit recounted at 
length the analyses of the Ninth and Second Circuits and expressly 
agreed with Zheng’s conclusion that “willful blindness” is the correct 
legal standard for acquiescence.105 It remanded the case to the agency 
                                                                                                  
100.  Id. at 170–71. 
101.  Id. at 171. 
102.  Id. (citing BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119). 
103.  Id. at 171. 
104.  473 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 2007). 
105.  Id. at 65–67, 69–70. Like the Ninth Circuit in Zheng, the Third Circuit 
barely mentioned the breach of legal responsibility language in the Senate 
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to consider whether country evidence indicating that the Colombian 
government fails to prosecute groups committing abuses and has a 
collusive relationship with some of those groups sufficed to show that 
officials there “turn a blind eye” to torturous conduct.106 
Nearly all the other federal appeals courts have agreed with 
these three decisions, rejecting the “willful acceptance” test and 
endorsing “willful blindness” as the proper standard.107 The BIA 
appears to have thrown in the towel. While it has never expressly 
overruled Matter of S-V-, the BIA stated in a 2017 precedential 
decision that acquiescence “include[s] the concept of willful 
blindness.”108 
D. The Incoherence of “Willful Blindness” as a Test for 
Acquiescence 
The judicial focus on “willful blindness” as the central 
consideration in determining acquiescence has led to considerable 
confusion in the case law about what the concept means, what it 
takes to establish willfully blindness, and when, if ever, officials’ 
inability to prevent acts of torture can amount to willful blindness. At 
the same time, the courts’ fixation on willful blindness has led them 
to all but ignore the breach of legal responsibility element, developing 
                                                                                                  
understanding and agency regulation, and appeared to assume that “willful 
blindness” is what it takes to satisfy both parts of the regulatory test. 
106.  Id. at 69–70. 
107.  See Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017); 
Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2013); Hakim v. 
Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 155–57 (5th Cir. 2010); Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 
(6th Cir. 2006); Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005). 
The Seventh Circuit has used language suggesting that it applies a “willful 
blindness” standard. See Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1182, 1185 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (stating that a CAT applicant targeted by a Mexican drug cartel 
appears to have a strong case given evidence that he would face “torture . . . to 
which local public officials are willfully blind.”). The First and Eleventh Circuits, 
without reaching the issue, have noted other Circuits’ disapproval of the willful 
acceptance standard. See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 19 n.6 (1st Cir. 
2012); Reyes-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004). 
108.  Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 82, 90 (B.I.A. 2017); see also 
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 226 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Zheng as “defining 
acquiescence as willful blindness”); Matter of G-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 98 (B.I.A. 
2013) (stating the applicant failed to show that “the Ghanaian government would 
acquiesce in or turn a blind eye to torture”). 
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no doctrine aimed at explicating where that legal responsibility comes 
from or what it requires. 
Most decisions endorsing a willful blindness test either state 
or assume that a showing of willful blindness is sufficient to establish 
acquiescence. Arguably, this has some support in legislative history. 
The Senate report on the CAT stated that the acquiescence 
understanding was meant “to make it clear that both actual 
knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the definition of the term 
‘acquiescence’ in article 1.”109 One might read that to mean that 
willful blindness satisfies both elements of the definition: awareness 
and breach of legal responsibility. But more likely, given the Bush 
Administration’s explanation that it changed “knowledge” to 
“awareness” to make clear that the term includes willful blindness, 
the Senate Committee simply meant that willful blindness falls 
within the definition because it satisfies the “awareness” 
component.110 As Parts II and III will show, officials willfully blind to 
torture should be viewed as breaching their legal responsibility under 
the CAT and other international law to take diligent preventive 
measures. But the U.S. CAT case law has thus far failed to explain 
why willful blindness violates a legal duty. 
More troublingly, courts have generally treated willful 
blindness as not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary 
condition for acquiescence. Opinions routinely characterize willful 
blindness as the test for acquiescence as a whole.111 Even after 
reciting the two-part regulatory definition, decisions go on to state, or 
assume in their reasoning, that officials do not breach their legal 
responsibility unless they willfully ignore torturous conduct.112 
                                                                                                  
109.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9; see also Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 
333, 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (alluding to that legislative history and then stating that 
acquiescence “can be found when government officials remain willfully blind to 
torturous conduct and thereby breach their legal responsibility to prevent it”). 
110.  See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
111.  See, e.g., Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating 
that “official acquiescence . . . exists when government officials were aware of the 
torture but remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2009))); Roye, 693 F.3d at 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that willful blindness is “the 
minimum mens rea requirement pertaining to those who consent to or acquiesce 
in acts of torture committed by others”). 
112.  See, e.g., Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting the acquiescence regulation, then restating it as, “[i]n colloquial 
terms, . . . [i]s the official willfully blind?” and instructing the BIA to apply the 
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As a legal concept, willful blindness has its origins in criminal 
law, where it developed as a justification for finding defendants guilty 
of offenses that require “knowing” conduct in situations where the 
person consciously avoided finding out key facts that would render 
them culpable (for example, taking money from a known drug dealer 
to drive a car with something hidden in the trunk, without ever 
asking what the trunk contains).113 The Supreme Court has described 
it as a state of mind that “surpasses recklessness and negligence” and 
requires “deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of 
wrongdoing.”114 
When willful blindness, designed to serve as a high-
culpability form of constructive knowledge, is used in CAT cases not 
only to establish “awareness” (a purpose for which it is well-suited), 
but also to define the scope of officials’ legal responsibility to take 
preventive action (a purpose to which it bears no logical relation), the 
results are predictable. Any response that amounts to more than 
“turning a blind eye”—in other words, officials taking any steps at all 
to protect the victims or pursue the perpetrators—can easily be 
characterized as something better than willful blindness. When 
                                                                                                  
willful blindness test to determine whether the response to torture amounted to 
acquiescence); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
the acquiescence regulation, then stating: “A government . . . cross[es] the line 
into acquiescence when it shows ‘willful blindness toward the torture of citizens 
by third parties.’” (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 
2005))); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting the regulation, then upholding BIA’s finding of no acquiescence because 
the evidence failed to show Honduran officials “would turn a blind eye to torture”). 
113.  These were the facts in a seminal criminal “willful blindness” decision, 
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See also Barry 
Gross & Stephen G. Stroup, Has the Legal Threshold for ‘Willful Blindness’ Really 
Changed Since Global-Tech?, 83 U.S.L.W. 1202, 1203 (2015) (discussing 
development of the concept in criminal case law). 
114.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011); see 
also Roye, 693 F.3d at 343 n.13 (quoting Global-Tech to explain what “willful 
blindness” means for purposes of CAT acquiescence). Regulations issued in the 
waning days of the Trump Administration added to the CAT acquiescence 
regulation a statement that “awareness” includes both actual knowledge and 
willful blindness and a definition of “willful blindness” drawn from Global-Tech. 
Final Rule, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear 
and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, at 80,369, 80,398 (Dec. 11, 
2020) [hereinafter December 2020 Final Rule] (discussing and setting forth text of 
amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7)); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, at 36,287 (June 15, 2020) [hereinafter June 2020 Proposed 
Rule] (citing Global-Tech as source of the rule’s definition of willful blindness). 
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governments take woefully inadequate, inept, or half-hearted 
measures to address known torturous activity, one could fairly call 
their response negligent or reckless, but it is hard to label it “willful 
blindness.” 
As an example, take Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, a 2017 Eighth 
Circuit decision.115 The CAT applicant in that case was a woman from 
Honduras who suffered prolonged and severe physical, sexual, and 
psychological abuse from a domestic partner who she feared would 
kill her upon her return. The court noted that evidence in the record 
showed “domestic violence is a widespread problem in 
Honduras, . . . impunity for persecutors is common, and . . . the laws 
and institutions in place to assist victims are largely ineffectual,” and 
observed, “[i]t is evident that the Honduran government has fallen 
short in providing the necessary resources to address the issue.”116 
Nonetheless, applying the willful blindness test, the court upheld the 
BIA’s finding of no acquiescence, concluding that this evidence did not 
compel a conclusion that the “government generally consents or 
acquiesces in domestic violence.”117 
Many cases involving applicants who fear torture from gangs 
or other non-State groups deploy similar reasoning. In one decision, a 
woman beaten and threatened by the M-18 gang in El Salvador was 
found not to have established acquiescence despite evidence of police 
corruption and the fact that an M-18 leader was able to call her from 
prison and offer to protect her from the gang if she visited and had 
sex with him at the prison, because “the record also show[ed] that El 
Salvador has taken steps to abate gang violence.”118 Another court 
                                                                                                  
115.  848 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2017). 
116.  Id. at 854. 
117.  Id. at 852, 854. The court also noted that the applicant never reported 
her abuse to the police and thus “never gave the government the opportunity to 
protect her” from the torturous conduct. Id. at 852. However, it appeared to accept 
that this was not fatal to a finding of acquiescence, but could be overcome if the 
evidence showed the government’s overall response to domestic violence was 
willfully blind. Id. at 854. 
118.  De Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 537, 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2018); see also 
Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1029–30, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (in 
which a Guatemalan woman, after being beaten and raped by masked men, was 
told police would not investigate unless she identified the assailants; the court 
upheld a finding of no-acquiescence because Guatemala took “steps to combat 
violence against women,” despite evidence that its efforts were weak and 
ineffective); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 609–12 (3d Cir. 
2011) (upholding a BIA no-acquiescence finding because media reports showed 
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upheld the BIA’s no-acquiescence finding in the case of a defector 
from a gang who was beaten and threatened when he refused to 
engage in acts of violence. It concluded that “widespread evidence of 
corruption” in the government and police, and the fact that when one 
beating was reported the police took no action beyond filing a report, 
were insufficient to show acquiescence because there was also 
evidence that the Salvadoran government “is attempting to take steps 
and actions to deal with police corruption” and “is accepting the 
United States’ assistance in combating the country’s gang 
enterprises.”119 Other cases find that as long as the police took any 
action when torturous activity or threats were reported to them—
even if it was just gathering some evidence or temporarily increasing 
patrols in the victim’s neighborhood—that is enough to negate willful 
blindness and justify a finding of no acquiescence.120 
Even the Second Circuit, the only Court of Appeals to 
consistently stress that awareness and breach of legal responsibility 
are distinct elements, has failed to offer a theory of what the second 
part of the acquiescence definition means. The Second Circuit has 
repeatedly stated that acquiescence can be shown by “evidence that 
                                                                                                  
that the Honduran government “seeks to combat the [gang] problem and protect 
its citizens,” despite applicant’s testimony that the five times he reported threats 
and violence to Honduran police they claimed they were investigating but there 
were no observable results). 
119.  Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 495–97, 501–02 (6th Cir. 
2015); see also Medina-Velasquez v. Sessions, 680 Fed. App’x 744, 746–47, 753–54 
(10th Cir. 2017) (upholding a BIA no-acquiescence finding despite a country 
expert’s testimony that the Honduran government fails to protect its citizens from 
gangs due to “lack of resources, corruption, and intimidation of prosecutors and 
judges,” because the expert conceded that Honduras “makes some attempt” to 
police gangs by imprisoning gang members). 
120.  See Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 575, 579–80 (8th Cir. 
2009) (affirming a no-acquiescence finding because when a Guatemalan woman 
reported death threats from the MS the police sent extra patrols to her 
neighborhood for a time, even though they took no further action and there was 
“evidence of general police reluctance to pursue gang members”); Reyes-Sanchez 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1241–43 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the denial 
of a CAT claim because the evidence did not show police “did nothing” after a 
Peruvian man reported violent threats from a rebel group, although all they did 
was come to the scene and gather evidence); Otunez-Turcios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 
341, 345–47, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding a no-acquiescence finding in a case 
where Guatemalan police escorted landlords to a meeting where a campesino 
opposing the landlords was killed and the police later arrested the shooter but 
failed to take any action against the landlords, who were implicated by the 
shooter when he confessed). 
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officials knew of private parties’ abusive actions and thereafter 
breached their legal responsibility to prevent such actions.”121 This at 
least opens up the possibility that acquiescence may exist where 
officials who know about torturous activity respond in a manner that 
is legally inadequate, even if not “willfully blind.” In Delgado v. 
Mukasey, the Second Circuit vacated the BIA’s denial of a CAT claim 
and remanded the case to the agency to consider whether the 
acquiescence standard was satisfied by evidence showing that local 
officials did little in response to a complaint the petitioner filed after 
she was kidnapped and threatened by FARC guerillas, and that 
Colombia’s government, to promote peace talks, had allowed the 
FARC to maintain control over a “Switzerland-sized area” of the 
country.122 But the court provided no guidance on how to determine 
whether those circumstances would amount to a legal breach, and if 
so, why. 
When, if ever, a government’s inability to prevent acts of 
torture by non-State actors can constitute “willful blindness” has also 
been a source of confusion in the case law.123 Courts routinely state 
that acquiescence requires more than a showing that officials are 
“unable or unwilling” to provide protection, the standard applicable to 
                                                                                                  
121.  Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks and emendations omitted) (partially quoting Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 
F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (characterizing the standard for acquiescence 
similarly). 
122.  Delgado, 508 F.3d at 709; see also Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 335 
(2d Cir. 2020) (remanding a CAT claim because the BIA failed to address the 
“legal responsibility” aspect of the acquiescence definition, and directing the 
agency to consider “what ‘legal responsibility’ Jamaican officials had to protect a 
serving police officer threatened with gang violence”). In one of the few decisions 
of other circuits to give distinct attention to the breach-of-legal-responsibility 
element, an Eighth Circuit panel instructed the BIA to address whether law 
enforcement officials who would not intervene to stop torture by rogue officers 
working for a drug cartel would be breaching their legal responsibility by failing 
to make arrests. Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 908 (8th Cir. 2009). 
123.  See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 
7:33 (2020) (“U.S. courts have not established a clear rule for determining 
whether a government’s inability to stop torturous acts by a non-state actor 
manifests . . . its acquiescence”); James Feroli, Developments Under the 
Convention Against Torture, 19-03 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (discussing the 
conflicting case law); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 335–36 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting 
uncertainty in the case law and remanding to the BIA to address how, if at all, 
authorities’ inability to fulfill their legal obligations of protection should inform 
the acquiescence determination). 
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asylum and withholding of removal claims.124 The willful blindness 
inquiry, as one court put it, “centers upon the willfulness of a 
government’s non-intervention.”125 Thus, the decisions generally 
agree that an official’s unwillingness to take any protective action 
will constitute acquiescence. 
Some courts have opened the door to considering a 
government’s inability to control private actors’ torturous conduct by 
reasoning that the CAT’s definition of torture requires only a showing 
that “a public official”126 —not the government generally—will likely 
acquiesce (or collude or participate in) the feared acts of torture. A 
much-cited Ninth Circuit case, Tapia Madrigal v. Holder,127 vacated a 
BIA ruling which denied CAT relief to a former member of the 
Mexican military who feared violent retaliation from the Los Zetas 
drug cartel. The Ninth Circuit found that the BIA erred by focusing 
on the Mexican government’s efforts to fight the Zetas as reason to 
conclude there would be no State acquiescence. Instead, the relevant 
question, based on evidence showing local police officers and prison 
officials frequently work for the cartels, was whether it was likely 
that the applicant, if he sought official help, would encounter at least 
one official who would turn a blind eye to the Zetas’ torturous 
activity. If so, the court reasoned, the Mexican government’s ability to 
control Los Zetas becomes highly relevant, because he is likely to face 
torture, with a public official’s acquiescence, unless the efforts of 
other government actors are efficacious enough to actually protect 
him from the Zetas’ violence.128 The Second, Third, and Seventh 
                                                                                                  
124.  See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 611 (3d Cir. 
2011) (stating the “unable or unwilling” asylum standard “is not applicable to a 
claim for relief under the CAT”); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (“A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely 
because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it, but does cross the line into 
acquiescence when it shows willful blindness toward the torture of its citizens by 
third parties.”); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that acquiescence requires more than a showing “that public officials would be 
merely unable or unwilling to prevent torture by private parties”). 
125.  Mouawad, 485 F.3d at 413. 
126.  Both the treaty’s torture definition and its implementing U.S. 
regulation use the singular: “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.” CAT art. 1(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) 
(emphasis added). 
127.  716 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2013). 
128.  Id. at 509–10. 
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Circuits have issued opinions with similar reasoning,129 and several 
other circuits have endorsed the idea that it is enough to show that a 
low-level official will likely acquiesce or participate in the feared 
torture, even if other government actors actively oppose the torturous 
activity.130 
Although these cases have been celebrated by some advocates 
as providing a roadmap to winning CAT protection for persons fleeing 
gang and cartel violence,131 their effect has been limited by the 
reluctance of many courts to infer from evidence of widespread official 
corruption that a particular CAT applicant is likely to be ignored or 
mistreated by the authorities when reporting a threat or incident.132 
                                                                                                  
129.  See De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where a 
government contains officials that would be complicit in torture, and the 
government . . . is admittedly incapable of actually preventing that torture, the 
fact that some officials take action to prevent the torture would [not seem to be] 
inconsistent with a finding of government acquiescence . . . .”); Rodriguez-
Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–40 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that it was 
enough to show that corrupt local officers had colluded with the Zetas in torturing 
him, and that preventive efforts by other government actors were irrelevant 
unless “the Mexican government could be expected to [actually] protect the 
petitioner from the Zetas should he be returned to Mexico”). Similar reasoning 
appears to underlie, at least in part, statements by the Third Circuit that a 
government’s inability to control groups engaged in torture, while not dispositive, 
may in some circumstances be relevant to establishing acquiescence through 
willful blindness. See Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 788, 792–93 (3d Cir. 
2019); Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 2011). 
130.  For examples of cases where courts have acknowledged that 
participation, collusion, or acquiescence in torture by low-level police officers is 
sufficient, see Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2019); Ireguas-
Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 812–13 (5th Cir. 2017); Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 
574 F.3d 893, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2009). 
131.  Several articles have hailed this line of cases as portending a more 
generous application of the CAT to individuals fleeing gang or cartel violence. See 
Feroli, supra note 123, at 5; Schulman, supra note 16, at 299; Benjamin H. 
Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening the Floodgates?: Refugee Law and Its 
Application to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135, 
162–64 (2012). 
132.  See, e.g., Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 497, 501–02 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (upholding BIA decision that evidence of widespread corruption 
throughout the Salvadoran government was insufficient to prove that a public 
official is likely to acquiesce to any future harm the applicant may face from 
gangs); see also supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text (discussing other 
case examples); ANKER, supra note 123, § 7:33 n.24 (listing Court of Appeals 
decisions which suggest that “proof of widespread corruption within government 
is not sufficient by itself to meet the acquiescence requirement”); Matter of G-K-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 98 (B.I.A. 2013) (upholding an immigration judge’s decision 
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If the person cannot point to past efforts to enlist official help that 
were met with willful blindness, or never went to the police because 
they believed it would do no good, the BIA and some reviewing courts 
seem particularly reluctant to conclude that there is a probability 
that officials will acquiesce to their torture.133 But other appellate 
panels have overturned BIA decisions for giving insufficient attention 
to evidence of a widespread pattern of corrupt collusion with criminal 
organizations or a general failure to enforce laws that protect at-risk 
groups from harm.134 
Another possible path to finding willful blindness in 
situations where a government, even if willing, lacks the ability to 
protect its citizens can be found in a few federal appeals court 
decisions holding that, to show acquiescence, “[i]t is enough that 
public officials remained willfully blind to [torturous conduct], or 
simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose 
                                                                                                  
that “generalized evidence of government corruption” was insufficient to show a 
government would acquiescence to torture). 
133.  See Matter of O-F-A-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 709, 720 (B.I.A. 2019), vacated 
on other grounds, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35, 42 (A.G. 2020) (rejecting a CAT acquiescence 
claim because the applicant did not report the incident to the police and “[i]t is not 
sufficient to simply assume that the police would not have responded”); Aldana-
Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding no-acquiescence 
finding because police investigated and made an arrest when the applicants’ 
father was murdered by a Guatemalan gang; evidence that suspects were released 
after the judge was bribed did not suffice because “petitioners have made no 
showing that similar bribery would likely occur in a future case”). But see Alvarez 
Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding the BIA erred by failing 
to consider, in the case of a Honduran woman threatened by a gang who did not 
seek help from the police, her testimony about why she believed local police 
colluded with the gang and other evidence that the police and gang shared 
information). 
134.  See, e.g., Quiroz Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(stating that “[e]vidence showing widespread corruption of public officials . . . can 
be highly probative” in establishing that an applicant will encounter officials 
likely to acquiesce in their torture); Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 657–60 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (holding, in the case of a woman who faced an honor killing in Jordan, 
that acquiescence was established by a pattern of lenient sentences imposed by 
the judiciary for honor killings and the fact that the government offered no 
protection for potential victims other than extended protective custody); Bromfield 
v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding evidence that Jamaican 
police generally fail to investigate attacks on gay men probative of its 
acquiescence to anti-gay violence). 
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it.”135 The Third Circuit applied this doctrine in the case of a 
Colombian woman who, when she reported to the police and the 
military that she had been kidnapped and threatened by FARC 
guerillas, was told there was nothing they could do to protect her. In 
essence, the court reasoned, the authorities indicated that “they 
would do nothing to stop” the torturous activities, which could 
support a finding of willful blindness—even if their reason for taking 
no action was that any steps they might try to take would be futile.136 
The Ninth Circuit similarly drew a distinction between officials’ 
“inability . . . to oppose criminal organizations,” which may suffice to 
establish acquiescence, and their “ineffective[ness] in preventing or 
investigating criminal activities,” which is insufficient.137 The “unable 
to oppose” formulation, which so far has found little traction outside 
these two circuits, may help some CAT applicants show acquiescence 
in situations where governments have lost control so completely that 
officials cannot do anything to counter groups engaging in torture and 
do not even try.138 But it leaves intact the willful blindness test for 
acquiescence, under which any enforcement efforts made by officials, 
no matter how inept, under-resourced, or ill-calculated to address the 
problem, will be viewed by most courts as sufficient to show that 
officials have not “turned a blind eye.” 
                                                                                                  
135.  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis 
added). 
136.  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350–51 (3d Cir. 2008); 
see also Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(applying the same reasoning to a case involving government inability to control 
paramilitary and drug trafficking groups). 
137.  Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding acquiescence was not established when Guatemalan police did not pursue 
an investigation because the victim could not identify her masked assailants, and 
country evidence showed that the Guatemalan government was taking some, 
albeit ineffective, steps to combat violence against women). 
138.  A December 2020 amendment to the CAT acquiescence regulation—
part of an extensive Trump Administration package of asylum-restricting rules 
that may be overturned in court or rescinded under President Biden—adds a 
sentence providing that an official will not be deemed to have breached a legal 
responsibility to intervene “if such person is unable to intervene, or if the person 
intervenes but is unable to prevent the activity that constitutes torture.” 
December 2020 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 80,398 (amending 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a)(7)). The commentary that accompanied the rule when it was 
proposed stated that it is meant to “supersede any judicial opinions that could be 
read to hold that an official actor could acquiesce to torturous activities [they are] 
unable to prevent.” June 2020 Proposed Rule, supra note 114, at 36,288. 
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. . . 
For nearly two decades, federal appeals courts have struggled 
to define the scope and meaning of official acquiescence under the 
CAT. While appropriately rejecting “willful acceptance” as the 
standard, the decisions have elevated “willful blindness”—a concept 
introduced in the legislative history to describe how officials may be 
aware of private actors’ torturous acts even if they lack actual 
knowledge—into a stand-alone test for acquiescence. But 
acquiescence, under the express terms of the Senate understanding, 
is defined by two elements: (1) awareness, followed by (2) a breach of 
legal responsibility. Willful blindness is often unnecessary for the 
first element, given that officials usually have actual knowledge that 
a particular sort of torturous violence is prevalent. And it is ill-suited 
as the measure for the second. Neither the treaty’s ratification history 
nor logic provides any basis for thinking that the only legal 
responsibility that public officials have in relation to torture is not to 
be willfully blind to it. When courts invoke willful blindness as the 
test for acquiescence, it is hard for them to avoid reaching the 
conclusion that any responsive action taken by officials, no matter 
how inadequate, shows they are not being willfully blind.139 
In order to give real effect to the language of the Senate 
understanding, and greater coherence to the case law, courts must 
seriously examine issues that willful blindness has thus far obscured. 
What legal responsibility do public officials have to intervene to 
prevent acts of torture? What is its source, and what are its contours? 
The next Part examines international law, where the idea of a legal 
obligation of “due diligence” on the part of States to prevent acts of 
torture has gained wide acceptance. Part III then explores how that 
                                                                                                  
139.  Some commentators have argued that under the “willful blindness” 
test, courts should find that officials acquiesce to domestic violence or other types 
of privately inflicted torture in situations where there has been some but 
inadequate action taken in response to a reported incident, or the government’s 
response to violence of that type is systemically deficient. See Freshwater, supra 
note 85, at 598–602; see also Lori A. Nessel, ‘Willful Blindness’ to Gender-Based 
Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 143–49 (2004) 
(suggesting that States are willfully blind when they fail to take adequate 
measures to prevent domestic violence). But it strains the ordinary and legal 
meaning of “willful blindness” to read the term that broadly, and, as we have 
seen, few courts have done so. 
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approach comports with the United States’ ratification and 
implementation of the CAT. 
II. ACQUIESCENCE AND THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT 
TORTURE UNDER THE CAT 
Given that the U.S., in ratifying the CAT, defined 
“acquiescence” by referencing the “legal responsibility” an official has 
to intervene to prevent torturous activity, it makes sense to look to 
the CAT itself as a source of legal responsibility.140 If the treaty 
imposes a legal duty on State officials to respond in certain ways to 
acts of torture by non-State actors, a failure to meet those 
responsibilities should be considered acquiescence. 
A broad consensus has emerged in the jurisprudence of U.N. 
treaty bodies and international human rights courts that States have 
an obligation to exercise “due diligence” to prevent acts of torture, 
whether inflicted by State officials or private parties—a duty to 
engage in serious and reasonable preventive and remedial measures 
that are proportional to the problem and likely to be effective in 
producing results.141 This Part will discuss how the due diligence 
approach developed and gained wide acceptance, and why it is 
justified as a matter of treaty interpretation. 
A. The Due Diligence Obligation to Prevent Torture in 
International Law 
The CAT was adopted not to outlaw torture, which was 
already illegal under international law, but to build a framework for 
more effective efforts by States to eradicate it.142 The CAT’s preamble 
                                                                                                  
140.  See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446–47 (observing that although the 
U.S. understanding “did not further specify to what legal responsibilities it 
referred” both national and international obligations may apply, “in particular the 
obligations entailed in the Convention Against Torture”); Rosati, supra note 12, at 
1775 (noting that legal duties to intervene to prevent acts of torture provided for 
in the CAT can give content to the “legal responsibility” referred to in the Senate 
understanding). 
141.  See Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. Liebowitz, Due Diligence and Gender 
Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301, 304–11, 
317–20, 327–29 (2015); see also infra notes 290–98 and accompanying text 
(discussing the meaning of due diligence). 
142.  See supra note 9; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 1 
(emphasizing the CAT did not outlaw torture but is aimed at strengthening its 
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specifically invokes Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), “both of which provide that no one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.”143 Nearly identical prohibitions also appeared in two 
major regional human rights treaties, the 1953 European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms144 
and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.145 
The due diligence principle emerged as an interpretation of 
what those provisions require of States when torture is committed by 
non-State actors. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in a 1982 
General Comment on ICCPR Article 7, expressed the view that it is 
“the duty of public authorities to ensure protection by the law against 
such treatment even when committed by persons . . . without any 
official authority,” and that this duty required States to effectively 
investigate complaints, hold those found guilty responsible, and 
provide effective remedies to victims.146 In subsequent general 
                                                                                                  
existing prohibition under international law); CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. 
(referencing existing prohibitions and then expressing the States parties’ desire to 
“make more effective the struggle against torture . . . throughout the world”). 
143.  CAT, supra note 1, pmbl., citing G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 71 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
144.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221, 224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
145.  American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 
1969, art. 5(2), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 146 (entered into force July 
18, 1978) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
punishment or treatment . . . .”). The 1981 African Charter on Human Rights 
similarly outlaws all torture. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
adopted Jun. 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) 
(“All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave 
trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited.”). International humanitarian law, since the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and even earlier, has proscribed all use of torture in armed conflict. 
See Rachel Lord, The Liability of Non-State Actors for Torture in Violation of 
International Humanitarian Law, 4 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 112, 121–26, 129–33 
(2003). 
146.  Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Annex 5 at 94, General comment 
7(16), ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (Sep. 22, 1982). Employing similar reasoning in a 
1987 ruling on an individual complaint, the Human Rights Committee found 
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comments, the Human Rights Committee elaborated on the State’s 
obligation to “exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or 
redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or 
entities.”147 
The seminal statement of the principle appeared in the first 
decision issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
1988 Velásquez Rodríguez case,148 which involved the disappearance 
in Honduras of a politically active student amid a pattern of 
kidnappings, torture, and disappearances of suspected government 
opponents. The complaint alleged violations of several provisions of 
the American Convention, including Article 5’s prohibition of 
torture.149 Although there was strong reason to suspect direct 
government involvement, the court’s opinion made it clear that the 
State’s responsibility did not depend on this: 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which 
is initially not directly imputable to a State (for 
example, because it is the act of a private person or 
because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of 
the State, not because of the act itself, but because of 
the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to 
respond to it . . . . The State has a legal duty to take 
reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations 
and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a 
serious investigation . . . , to identify those 
                                                                                                  
Colombia violated article 6 of the ICCPR (right to life) in a case of disappearance 
and death because the State failed in its duty to “take specific and effective 
measures to prevent” disappearances and failed to conduct a thorough 
investigation. Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, No. 161/1983, ¶ 10.3 (Hum. Rts. Comm. 
Dec. 1, 1987). 
147.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004); see also Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment 20: Article 7, ¶¶ 2, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) (discussing the 
duty of States parties to “afford everyone protection through legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7,” including 
acts inflicted by persons acting “in a private capacity”). 
148.  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988); see also NIGEL S. RODLEY, 
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (2d ed. 1999) 
(noting that “the Velásquez Rodríguez case has been influential beyond the region 
in clarifying the normative status and legal consequences of torture”). 
149.  Velásquez Rodríguez, ¶¶ 1–3, 147–48. 
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responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment 
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.150 
Honduras was found liable because its law enforcement officials did 
not conduct a “serious investigation” of Velásquez’s disappearance 
and its judges failed to act when writs were filed on his behalf.151 
The European Court of Human Rights has also long 
interpreted the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in 
Article 3 of the European Convention as requiring States to take 
effective steps to prevent and punish private actors’ abuses.152 It most 
fully articulated its due diligence doctrine in Opuz v. Turkey, which 
held that Turkish officials violated Article 3 by failing to protect a 
woman from severe domestic violence at the hands of her domestic 
partner.153 The authorities arrested her partner several times, but 
repeatedly released him with little or no punishment, and did little to 
                                                                                                  
150.  Id. ¶¶ 172, 174. 
151.  Id. ¶¶ 178–82. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has also adopted Velásquez Rodríguez’s due diligence approach as its 
standard for assessing State responsibility for torture or other rights violations by 
private parties. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe,  
No. 245/2002, Decision, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ¶¶ 141–
60 (May 2006). 
152.  See, e.g., Z & Ors. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, ¶¶ 69–
75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59455 (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (finding State responsible for 
parents’ acts of child abuse because Article 3 “requires States to take 
measures . . . to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected 
to torture,” and those measures should “provide effective protection . . . of children 
and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-
treatment of which the authorities had. . . knowledge”); X & Y v. The Netherlands, 
App. No. 8978/80, ¶¶ 7–11, 21–27, 30, 33–34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 26, 1985), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603 (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review) (finding State responsible for sexual assault of a mentally 
disabled 16-year old girl at a privately-run group home because it failed to pursue 
criminal proceedings and thus breached its duty to provide “effective deterrence” 
and “practical and effective protection”). As early as the 1970s, decisions of the 
European Commission had declared that States may be held responsible for rights 
violations by private actors if they fail to take appropriate measures to counter 
them. See Geraldine Van Bueren, Opening Pandora’s Box: Protecting Children 
Against Torture or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 
L. & POL’Y 377, 383 (1995) (discussing Commission decisions). 
153.  Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶ 176 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92945 (on file with the Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review). The court also found violations of other provisions of 
the European Convention, including Article 2’s right to life due to the Turkish 
authorities’ failure to protect against the murder of the applicant’s mother. 
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protect the victim until his violence finally culminated in the murder 
of the woman’s mother.154 The European Court noted that while 
national authorities “did not remain totally passive” their response 
“was manifestly inadequate to the gravity of the offenses in question” 
and failed to meet their duty to take “all reasonable measures to 
prevent the recurrence of violent attacks.”155 It cautioned that due 
diligence must be interpreted in a way that “does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities” and takes 
into account the need to respect due process. But, where authorities 
know or ought to be aware of violent attacks or threats that place an 
individual at immediate risk, officials are obligated to do all that 
could reasonably be expected of them to avoid or mitigate that risk.156 
The U.N. General Assembly’s 1993 Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women explicitly called on States to 
“[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and . . . punish acts of 
violence against women,” whether by the State or private persons, 
and “[a]dopt all appropriate measures . . . to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct” that foster such violence.157 In 2006, the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women issued an 
extensive report on the due diligence standard, tracing its origins and 
concluding, in light of its broad acceptance by treaty bodies and 
human rights tribunals, that it had ripened into “a rule of customary 
international law that obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of 
violence against women with due diligence.”158 
                                                                                                  
154.  Id. ¶¶ 7–69. 
155.  Id. ¶¶ 162–70. 
156.  Id. ¶¶ 129–30. The Court also pointed to failures of due diligence at 
the systemic level, including a “culture of domestic violence” in Turkey, the 
general reluctance of police and prosecutors to intervene, and unwarranted 
leniency on the part of courts. Id. ¶¶ 91–99. 
157.  G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/104, at art. 4(c), (j) (Dec. 20, 1993). A 
1994 regional human rights treaty adopted similar wording, requiring States 
parties to “apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for 
violence against women” and pursue a range of other preventive and remedial 
policies, including taking “all appropriate measures” to modify “legal or customary 
practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women.” 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), art. 7 (June 9, 1994). 
158.  Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its 
Causes and Consequences), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶¶ 19–29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 
(Jan. 20, 2006). The report extensively discusses the preventive, protective, 
punitive, and remedial duties States may be held to under the due diligence 
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Given the CAT’s stated goal of making the already existing 
international law prohibition of torture more effective, a strong case 
exists for reading it to impose the same due diligence obligation on 
States that is widely accepted under the ICCPR and other 
international law instruments. The CAT does differ from other anti-
torture treaties in that it contains its own, more State-focused 
definition of torture.159 It also lacks language that appears in the 
ICCPR and regional treaties obligating States to “secure” or “ensure” 
the guaranteed rights to all persons in their territory, which courts 
and treaty bodies have pointed to as partial justification for a State 
duty of due diligence to protect against private violations.160 
Those differences, however, need not mean that the CAT 
imposes a lesser duty to protect against private acts of torture. The 
presence of “acquiescence” in the CAT’s torture definition opens the 
door to a due diligence interpretation. Moreover, the CAT’s 
substantive Articles impose an array of affirmative duties on States 
to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture that fit in 
well with a due diligence approach. Article 2 mandates that “[e]ach 
State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or 
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.” Subsequent Articles lay out more specific obligations, 
                                                                                                  
standard. Id. ¶¶ 30–55, 74–93; see also Rashida Manjoo, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/49 (May 14, 2013) (elaborating further on the due diligence standard). 
159.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (limiting the definition of torture to 
situations “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity”); see also Andrew Byrnes, The Committee Against Torture, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 509, 509–13, 
540 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (discussing the desirability of interpreting the CAT 
in a manner consistent with other human rights instruments prohibiting torture, 
while at the same time grounding interpretation in the CAT’s particular text, 
purpose, and history). 
160.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm. Gen. Cmt. No. 31, supra note 147, ¶ 8 
(deriving the due diligence duty from both ICCPR Article 7 and Article 2(1)’s 
requirement that States “ensure” the guaranteed rights); Opuz v. Turkey, App. 
No. 33401/02, ¶ 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) (relying on both Article 3 of the 
European Convention and Article 1’s requirement that States “secure” rights to 
all within their jurisdiction); Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 4 ¶¶ 166–75 (July 29, 1988) (relying on States’ obligation under 
Article 1(1) to “ensure” all rights protected by the American Convention); 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, ¶¶ 142, 164 (2006) (relying 
on Article 1 of the African Charter requiring States to “adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect” to the guaranteed rights). 
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including requirements that the State criminalize and appropriately 
punish acts of torture (Articles 4–9), promptly investigate whenever 
there is reasonable ground to believe an act of torture has been 
committed (Article 12), ensure that all complaints are promptly and 
impartially examined and that complainants and witnesses are 
protected against retaliation (Article 13), and ensure that the legal 
system provides redress and appropriate compensation to victims 
(Article 14).161 A failure by State officials to take effective preventive 
measures against private acts of torture in accordance with these 
Articles can be regarded as a form of “acquiescence.” 
The first report issued by the newly-created office of the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1986 noted that, while the CAT did 
not cover acts of purely private brutality, the drafters’ decision to add 
“consent or acquiescence” to the treaty’s State responsibility language 
meant that when officials take a “passive attitude” toward practices 
like sexual mutilations, the State’s failure “to ensure protection by 
the law against such treatment” can be considered acquiescence.162 
Sir Nigel Rodley, the second U.N. Special Rapporteur, addressing 
racism and torture in one of his reports, noted that when minority 
groups face threat or attack from private citizens, the lack of “due 
prevention and diligence” by public officials “further encourages such 
private violence” and represents acquiescence.163 
                                                                                                  
161.  CAT, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4–9, 12–14. 
162.  P. Kooijmans (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 38, 49, U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/1986/15 (Feb. 19, 1986). The Special Rapporteur position was created in 
1985 under a U.N. resolution that references the CAT and charges the Special 
Rapporteur with reporting annually to U.N. bodies on matters pertaining to 
torture. See ANKER, supra note 123, § 7:13; see also RODLEY, supra note 148, at 
145–50 (discussing the origins and mandate of the office). 
163.  Sir Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Civil and Political Rights 
Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2001/66 
(Jan. 25, 2001). Rodley similarly wrote, in a report issued a few months earlier: 
“Under international law, [the “consent or acquiescence”] element of the [torture] 
definition makes the State responsible for acts committed by private individuals 
which it did not prevent from occurring or, if need be, for which it did not provide 
appropriate remedies.” Sir Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/66 (Nov. 14, 2000). The U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
in a 2002 report on torture, cited the Special Rapporteur’s view that States are 
 
2021] Obscured by “Willful Blindness” 783 
By 2001, the U.N. Committee Against Torture, in exercising 
its authority to comment on the periodic reports each State party is 
required to submit under the CAT,164 regularly expressed concern 
about the failure of officials in various countries to adequately protect 
against, investigate, prosecute, and appropriately punish attacks 
against racial and religious minorities and violence against women.165 
Around the same time, the Committee began to draw on the 
international jurisprudence of due diligence in ruling on individual 
complaints.166 In its 2002 Dzemajl decision, it found that Yugoslav 
authorities had acquiesced in a mob attack on a Roma settlement 
                                                                                                  
responsible under the CAT not only for torturous acts committed by officials or 
state-supported groups like paramilitaries, but also in situations where the 
authorities do not “provide effective protection from ill-treatment (i.e. fail to 
prevent or remedy such acts), including ill-treatment by non-State actors.” U.N. 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 4 (Rev. 1), 
Combating Torture 34 (2002) (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
164.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 19. 
165.  Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture: Twenty-Fifth Session (13–24 
November 2000) Twenty-sixth session (30 Apr.–18 May 2001), GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 44 (A/56/44) (2001), at ¶ 81(d), 82(j) (expressing concern at mob violence 
against Jehovah’s Witnesses in Georgia “and the failure of the police to intervene 
and take appropriate action,” and recommending that “[e]ffective measures be 
taken to prosecute and punish violence against women . . . including adopting 
appropriate legislation, . . . raising awareness of the problem [and] including the 
issue in the training of law-enforcement officials”), ¶ 104(c), (d) (expressing 
concern at the failure of police in Slovakia to provide “adequate protection” 
against racially motivated attacks on Roma by extremists and authorities’ failure 
to “carry out prompt, impartial and thorough investigations . . . or to prosecute or 
punish those responsible”), ¶¶ 113(b), 114(a) (expressing concern to the Czech 
Republic about “continuing reports of violent attacks against Roma and the 
alleged failure on the part of police and judicial authorities to provide adequate 
protection and to investigate and prosecute such crimes, as well as the lenient 
treatment of offenders”); see also ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 217–18 (2011) (describing other concluding 
observations issued by the Committee on gender violence by private actors). 
166.  The Committee is authorized to receive and issue its views on 
complaints filed by individuals who allege they have been subjected to a violation 
of the CAT by a State party, but only if the State in question has made a 
declaration that it recognizes the Committee’s competence to do so. CAT, supra 
note 1, art. 22. This is the only CAT mechanism the United States opted not to 
join. See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 6, 9. U.S. tribunals have nonetheless 
cited and relied on individual decisions issued by the Committee for their 
persuasive value as interpretations of the treaty. See Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 291, 303 (B.I.A. 2002); Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312–13 (B.I.A. 
2000). 
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because they failed to take appropriate steps to protect residents 
during the attack and afterwards conducted an inadequate 
investigation that failed to bring any of the perpetrators to justice.167 
The Committee prefaced its finding of State responsibility with an 
extensive discussion of the due diligence standard as developed in the 
comments and case law of the Human Rights Committee and the 
Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights.168 
In May 2002, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board 
issued guidance on applying legislation that incorporated the CAT’s 
torture definition and non-refoulement requirement.169 The guidelines 
expressly linked the concept of “acquiescence” to a State’s failure to 
fulfill its duties under Articles 2 and 12–14 of the CAT.170 Thus, 
adjudicators could infer acquiescence or “state approval” in 
circumstances where officials fail to take effective preventive 
measures or fail to properly investigate and prosecute acts of torture 
committed by private actors.171 The guidelines endorsed the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur’s reasoning that a lack of “due prevention and 
diligence” by State officials fosters further acts of private violence and 
therefore implies state responsibility through acquiescence.172 
                                                                                                  
167.  Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, No. 161/2000, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 
(2002), ¶¶ 2.1–2.27, 9.1–9.5. Because it concluded that the harm suffered by the 
complainant did not rise to the level of torture, the Committee based its ruling on 
Article 16 of the CAT, which requires States to undertake to prevent acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, and includes language on acquiescence identical 
to that found in Article 1’s definition of torture. See id. ¶¶ 9.2–9.3. 
168.  See id. at ¶¶ 8.5–8.14; see also Osmani v. Serbia, No. 261/2005, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/42/D/261/2005 (2009), ¶¶10.3–11 (finding that Serbia acquiesced in 
an anti-Roma attack based on reasoning similar to Dzemajl). 
169.  IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BD., CONSOLIDATED GROUNDS IN THE 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT—PERSONS IN NEED OF 
PROTECTION—DANGER OF TORTURE § 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter CANADIAN 
GUIDELINES] (explaining that Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
§ 97(1), S.C. 2001, c. 27, provides for a refugee-like status for a “person in need of 
protection,” defined to include those whose removal would subject them to danger 
of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the CAT). 
170.  Id. § 5.2.6, at 43–45. 
171.  Id. § 5.2.6, at 43. The guidelines added that even if a State has not 
formally ratified the CAT, its failure to follow the obligations set forth in the 
treaty should be considered a basis for finding acquiescence. Id. 
172.  Id. § 5.2.6 at 44–45 (discussing and quoting 2001 Special Rapporteur 
report, supra note 163). The guidelines went on to note that lack of success in 
preventing acts of torture is not necessarily indicative of acquiescence where the 
State has opposed the acts and attempted in good faith to prevent and protect 
against them. Id. at 45. 
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In November 2007, the U.N. Committee Against Torture 
issued the extensive and highly influential General Comment No. 2 
explicating Article 2 of the CAT, which requires States parties to take 
effective measures to prevent acts of torture.173 The Comment begins 
by noting that Article 2 sets out the core obligation of the treaty and 
encompasses, but is not limited to, the more specific duties listed in 
the provisions that follow.174 The Committee expressly endorsed the 
“due diligence” standard and found that a failure by officials to act 
diligently to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy torturous 
activity constitutes “acquiescence” under Article 1’s torture 
definition.175 Here are some of its key passages: 
States parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or 
other obstacles that impede the eradication of 
torture . . . [and] take positive effective measures to 
ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof 
are effectively prevented . . . . If the measures adopted 
by the State party fail to accomplish the[ir] 
purpose . . . , the Convention requires that they be 
revised and/or that new, more effective measures be 
adopted. . . . 
 
                                                                                                  
173.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (“Each State party shall take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction.”); Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38; see also Lisa 
Davis, Preventing Torture: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 11 N.Y.C. L. 
REV. 179, 180 (2008) (describing the General Comment’s issuance and 
importance); Felice D. Gaer, Opening Remarks: General Comment No. 2, 11 
N.Y.C. L. REV. 187, 188–90 (2008) (reflecting the perspective of Felice Gaer—who 
has served on the Committee since 2000 as an independent expert nominated by 
the United States—on the Comment’s significance and the process by which the 
Committee prepared it).  
174.  Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1–3; see also MANFRED NOWAK, ET AL., 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND ITS OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 79 (2d ed. 2019) (discussing article 2’s function as an 
umbrella clause that sets forth the basic obligation which is elaborated upon in 
the more specific articles that follow); CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE 
AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 249 (2001) (discussing the same). 
175.  Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶18; see also Rhonda Copelon, Gender 
Violence as Torture: The Contribution of CAT General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y.C. 
L. REV. 229, 254–55 (2008) (discussing the importance of General Comment No. 2 
in clarifying the meaning of acquiescence under the CAT and linking it to the due 
diligence obligation that had been developed in interpretations of the ICCPR and 
American Convention). 
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[W]here State authorities . . . know or have 
reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture . . . 
are being committed by non-State officials or private 
actors and they fail to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish 
[them] . . . , the State bears responsibility and its 
officials should be considered as . . . responsible under 
the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in 
such impermissible acts. Since the failure of the State 
to exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, sanction 
and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates 
and enables non-State actors to commit acts 
impermissible under the Convention with impunity, 
the State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of 
encouragement and/or de facto permission . . . . 
 
The protection of certain minority or marginalized 
individuals or populations especially at risk of torture 
is a part of the obligation to prevent torture or ill-
treatment . . . . States parties should, therefore, 
ensure the protection of members of groups especially 
at risk of being tortured, by fully prosecuting and 
punishing all acts of violence and abuse against these 
individuals and ensuring implementation of other 
positive measures of prevention and protection . . . .176 
The Committee Against Torture has applied the approach to 
acquiescence elaborated in General Comment No. 2 in its comments 
on States parties’ reports and decisions on individual complaints.177 
In concluding observations on Greece’s report in 2012, the Committee 
noted that despite some legislation and other measures taken to 
address domestic violence and trafficking, the persistence of these 
abuses and limited number of investigations and prosecutions 
indicated that the State needed to undertake further “effective 
preventive measures,” including prompt and effective law 
enforcement response to allegations, awareness-raising campaigns 
aimed at prevention, and support services for victims.178 In Njamba 
and Balikosa v. Sweden, the Committee ruled in favor of a Congolese 
                                                                                                  
176.  Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 4, 18, 21. 
177.  See NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 174, at 87–88 (discussing the 
Committee’s application of the due diligence principle). 
178.  U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, ¶¶ 23–24, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/GRC/CO/5-6 (June 27, 2012). 
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mother and daughter who claimed that their deportation by Sweden 
would violate Article 3 by exposing them to a high risk of sexual 
violence in their home country. Relying primarily on country evidence 
showing an “alarming number of cases of rape and sexual violence 
throughout the country,” the Committee, sustaining the complaint, 
referred to General Comment No. 2 and found that the authorities in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo were not exercising due diligence to 
prevent this widespread torturous activity.179 Reports by U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture Manfred Nowak (2008), Juan Méndez (2016), 
and Nils Melzer (2019) built upon General Comment No. 2 by 
applying the due diligence approach to analyze the ways in which 
States may acquiesce to torturous acts of “private” violence against 
women and LGBTQI people.180 
The due diligence standard for holding States responsible for 
acts of torture committed by private actors has gained broad 
acceptance in international human rights law since its emergence in 
                                                                                                  
179.  Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden, No. 322/2007, ¶ 9.5, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/44/D/322/2007 (2010); see also Bakatu-Bja v. Sweden, ¶ 10.6, No. 279/2009, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/46/D/379/2009 (2011) (making similar findings in the case of 
another woman fearing sexual violence in the DRC, and noting that “despite 
efforts by authorities to combat it, this phenomenon is still widespread”); Dewage 
v. Australia, No. 387/2009, ¶10.9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/51/387/2009 (2013) (referring 
to General Comment No. 2 and the duty “to exercise due diligence to intervene 
and stop the abuses” in discussing whether the Sri Lankan government would be 
responsible for risks the complainant faced from a non-State group). 
180.  For example, States may acquiesce through law enforcement officials’ 
failure to view offenses as serious and pursue them vigorously, undue leniency by 
judges, maintaining discriminatory laws that keep women trapped in abusive 
relationships, failing to take measures to address societal structures and values 
that perpetuate domestic violence, statements made by political leaders that 
dehumanize members of certain groups or defend practices like honor killings, 
and laws criminalizing same-sex relations that encourage anti-gay violence. See 
U.N. Secretary-General, Note to Members of the General Assembly on the Interim 
Rep. of Special Rapporteur Nils Melzer on the Relevance of the Prohibition of 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the 
Context of Domestic Violence, U.N. Doc. A/74/148 (July 12, 2019) [hereinafter 
2019 SR Report] (discussing the CAT’s application to domestic violence); U.N. 
Secretariat, Note to the Human Rights Council on the Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Juan E. Méndez, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57 (Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
2016 SR Report] (discussing the CAT’s application to gender-based and sexuality-
based violence); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, to the Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter SR Report] 
(discussing torture faced by women in relation to the CAT). 
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the 1980s. First developed under ICCPR and regional treaties that 
prohibit all torture—a prohibition the CAT was designed to make 
more effective—it has become the prevailing interpretation of the 
meaning of “acquiescence” under the CAT, as reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the U.N. Committee Against Torture, successive 
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture, and the Canadian guidelines. 
The Committee Against Torture’s interpretations of the treaty 
deserve particular weight because its ten independent experts are 
elected by all the States parties,181 and the CAT expressly authorizes 
the Committee to comment on State reports, initiate investigations of 
systemic violations, and address complaints of violations made by 
States or individuals.182  
B. The Meaning of “Acquiescence” as a Matter of Treaty 
Interpretation 
The existence of an international consensus in favor of a due 
diligence standard may not be sufficient by itself to convince U.S. 
courts that this is the correct interpretation of the treaty. This 
Section examines how this reading of acquiescence fares when the 
usual judicial tools for interpreting treaties are applied to the CAT. 
In construing treaties, the Supreme Court has taken an 
approach generally consistent with that of the Vienna Convention on 
                                                                                                  
181.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 17. 
182.  CAT, supra note 1, arts. 19–22. The Committee’s authority to issue 
general comments aimed at all States parties can be inferred from these 
provisions. See INGELSE, supra note 174, at 150–52 (identifying sources of the 
authority to issue general comments); Byrnes, supra note 159, at 529–30 
(discussing the same). The BIA and courts have at times looked to the 
Committee’s jurisprudence for guidance in interpreting the CAT. See supra notes 
71–72, 76, 166 and accompanying text (discussing BIA consideration of 
Committee’s interpretations); Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 555–56 
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that although not binding the Committee’s 
“pronouncements . . . may afford significant guidance in interpreting the language 
of [the CAT]”), vacated on other grounds, Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 
239 (3d Cir. 2008). In interpreting asylum law provisions that derive from refugee 
treaties, U.S. courts often look to the interpretations of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, citing the significant implementing role the treaties 
confer on that office. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–39, 439 
n.22 (1987) (referencing such interpretations, including the UNHCR Handbook); 
Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 154 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020) (referencing the UNHCR’s 
Sexual Orientation Guidelines). 
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the Law of Treaties,183 which calls for interpretation “in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”184 
Evidence of context and purpose can be found, inter alia, in a treaty’s 
preamble and in subsequent practice of the parties regarding the 
treaty’s interpretation.185 The treaty’s negotiating history (travaux 
préparatoires) may be consulted as a supplemental source.186 The 
Supreme Court has echoed the Vienna Convention in stating that 
“analysis must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in 
which the written words are used,” giving “significant weight” to the 
interpretations of “our sister signatories,” and referring to the treaty’s 
drafting and negotiation history when helpful in resolving textual 
ambiguities.187 
Two things are worth noting at the outset. First, the 
interpretation of “acquiescence” reached by the Committee Against 
Torture, acting on behalf of all of the States parties, is evidence of 
subsequent State practice reflecting a shared view by the parties 
regarding the treaty’s meaning, and should receive significant weight 
                                                                                                  
183.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
Although the U.S. never ratified the Vienna Convention, the Executive Branch 
has long treated it as an authoritative guide to treaty interpretation, and the 
International Court of Justice has found that it reflects binding customary 
international law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of 
State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the Convention Against 
Torture and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2013), at 7. 
184.  Vienna Convention, supra note 183, at art. 31(1). 
185.  Id. arts. 31(2)–(3) (providing that the “context” comprises “the text, 
including its preamble and annexes” as well as any related agreements or 
instruments made in connection with the treaty, and that “[t]here shall be taken 
into account, together with the context: . . . (b) any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation”). 
186.  Id. art. 32 (providing that a treaty’s preparatory work may be 
consulted to confirm the meaning derived by applying article 31, to resolve 
ambiguities, or to avoid a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”). 
187.  Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397, 400, 404 (1985); see also 
Olympic Airways v. Hussain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the importance of considering the interpretations of other States when 
construing a treaty); see also Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authority in 
U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 391, 405–20 (2013) 
(discussing the role of interpretations by States parties in construing statutes that 
incorporate treaty provisions). 
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when the United States interprets the treaty.188 Second, as previously 
noted, the ordinary meaning of the word “acquiescence” is ambiguous. 
It has definitions that resonate with the idea of tacit consent or 
approval, but it can also connote a failure to engage in serious effort 
to stop something, even if one disapproves.189 To ascertain its 
meaning in the CAT, we will need to look at the broader context of 
how the term fits into the structure and purposes of the treaty, and 
look for clues in the treaty’s drafting history. These travaux 
préparatoires can be found in various U.N. documents that report on 
the discussions and actions of the Working Group of the Commission 
on Human Rights that developed the treaty from 1978–1984 and in a 
1988 handbook on the CAT written by two diplomats who played a 
central role in the drafting process, Herman Burgers of the 
Netherlands and Hans Danelius of Sweden, which gives a detailed 
account of its background and drafting.190 
The treaty’s text provides some initial indications that the 
drafters intended acquiescence to have a broad meaning. The term 
appears in Article 1 as part of the phrase “consent or acquiescence,” 
suggesting that it is not limited to acceptance or tacit approval, which 
the word “consent” would have been adequate to cover.191 In addition, 
Article 4 of the CAT requires States to criminalize not only acts of 
torture, but also “an act by any person which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture,” without using the word “acquiescence.”192 
This further suggests that acquiescence is not synonymous with 
“complicity,” but has a broader scope. 
The CAT’s preamble also provides relevant context for 
interpreting the treaty’s terms, and it supports reading 
“acquiescence” to encompass a due diligence obligation. The preamble 
states that the parties agree to the Convention’s terms “having 
                                                                                                  
188.  Canada’s incorporation of the due diligence standard into its 
adjudicatory guidelines is further evidence of State practice. See CANADIAN 
GUIDELINES, supra note 169 and text accompanying notes 169–172. 
189.  See Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (citing one 
dictionary definition); supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing other 
dictionary definitions). 
190.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at v–vi. 
191.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
192.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (“Each State Party shall ensure that all 
acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an 
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.”) 
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regard to” and desiring to effectuate the ICCPR’s and UDHR’s 
prohibition of all torture.193 The reference to the ICCPR is especially 
salient given that, by 1982, two years before the CAT was finalized, 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee had interpreted the ICCPR’s 
prohibition to entail a State duty to engage in effective preventive 
efforts against private acts of torture.194   
On the other hand, the history and context of the treaty also 
reflects that the drafters were primarily focused on state-sponsored 
torture, particularly against persons held in official detention. The 
CAT developed from a declaration on torture adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly in December 1975,195 which is referenced in the 
CAT’s preamble.196 The Declaration was a response to a campaign to 
abolish torture launched by Amnesty International in the early 1970s 
that focused on the use of torture by repressive regimes.197 It was 
drawn up by a U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders and it contained a definition of torture that 
only covered acts “inflicted by or at the instigation of a public 
official.”198 Two years after adopting the Declaration, the General 
Assembly directed the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a 
draft convention “in light of” the Declaration’s principles.199 The 
                                                                                                  
193.  CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 4, 6 (“The States parties to this 
Convention, . . . . Having regard to article 5 of the [UDHR] and article 7 of the 
[ICCPR], both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to 
torture . . . . Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture . . . 
throughout the world, Have agreed as follows . . . .”). 
194.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Article 17(2) of the CAT 
also suggests the drafters desired that the CAT be interpreted in harmony with 
the ICCPR. It provides that in nominating members of the Committee Against 
Torture, States parties “shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons 
who are also members of the Human Rights Committee,” the U.N. body that 
oversees compliance with the ICCPR. See Byrnes, supra note 159, at 510–11. 
195.  G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter “Declaration”], 
reprinted in BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 191. 
196.  CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 5 (“Having regard also to the 
[Declaration]”). 
197.  See Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 275, 294–307 (1994). 
198.  Declaration, supra note 195, art. 1; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, 
supra note 4, at 13–17, 120 (tracing the events surrounding the adoption of the 
Declaration in 1975). 
199.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 120; G.A. Res. 32/62 (Dec. 8, 
1977), reprinted in id. at 196 (discussing and setting forth the text of the G.A. 
resolution). The resolution also invokes the ICCPR and UNDHR provisions 
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Commission’s working group significantly expanded the torture 
definition when it added the phrase “or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official.”200 Nonetheless, some CAT 
commentators, especially in the treaty’s early years, emphasized the 
State-focused context of the treaty’s drafting as reason to read the 
State responsibility language narrowly, viewing it as reaching private 
torturous conduct only when committed by persons who were acting 
in some sense as agents of the State, furthering its purposes.201 
The crucial question, then, is whether the addition of 
“acquiescence” to the torture definition is best construed as 
expanding State responsibility to reflect an affirmative duty to take 
preventive action, or to have a narrower scope more akin to tacit 
acceptance. The drafting history sheds some light on differing views 
the amendment was meant to bridge. An initial draft prepared by the 
Swedish government contained a torture definition essentially 
identical to that of the U.N. Declaration, covering only acts “inflicted 
by or at the instigation of a public official.”202 Discussion of whether 
                                                                                                  
prohibiting all torture, as do the preambles of the Declaration and the CAT itself. 
Id.; compare with Declaration, supra note 195, pmbl. ¶ 4, and CAT, supra note 1, 
pmbl. ¶ 4. 
200.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
201.  See, e.g., Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: 
International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 31 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84, 93 (1999) (characterizing the CAT’s torture 
definition as requiring “infliction of suffering by the state for particular ends”); 
Maxime E. Tardu, The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 56 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 
303, 306 (1987) (stating that “acquiescence” was added to reach “‘do nothing’ 
attitudes towards vigilante and ‘death-squad’ groups” but would not apply to 
other forms of private violence like severe domestic abuse); Natan Lerner, The 
U.N. Convention on Torture, 16 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 126, 134 (1986) (viewing 
CAT’s torture definition as covering only acts “inflicted by, or with the agreement 
of, public officials”). Sir Nigel Rodley, whose statements as Special Rapporteur 
helped spur the development of the due diligence approach, on other occasions 
stressed that the CAT is primarily aimed at torture inflicted for State purposes 
and viewed acquiescence as implying official collusion. See Nigel S. Rodley, The 
Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 467, 
484–87 (2002). 
202.  Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Draft International Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,  
art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1285 (Jan. 23, 1978), reprinted in BURGERS & 
DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 203 [hereinafter Original Swedish Draft]. In addition 
to incorporating the Declaration’s definition of torture, the substantive provisions 
of the original Swedish draft largely followed the Declaration, with the important 
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that approach was too limited began in the Working Group’s first 
session in 1978, and was taken up more intensively and resolved 
when the group met again in early 1979.203 The canonical account of 
these discussions is given by Burgers and Danelius: 
There were different opinions on the question as to 
whether or not the definition of torture in the 
convention should be limited to acts of public officials. 
It was pointed out by many States that the purpose of 
the convention was to provide protection against acts 
committed on behalf of, or at least tolerated by, the 
public authorities, whereas the State could normally 
be expected to take action according to its criminal 
law against private persons having committed acts of 
torture against other persons. However, France 
considered that the definition of the act of torture 
[focus on] the act of torture itself, irrespective of the 
status of the perpetrator. 
 
Although there was little support for the French view 
on this matter, most States agreed that the 
convention should not only be applicable to acts 
committed by public officials, but also to acts for 
which the public authorities could otherwise 
considered to have some responsibility. [In place of 
the language used in the original Swedish draft], the 
United States preferred the concept of “acquiescence 
of” rather than “instigation by” a public official. . . . In 
the end, it was generally agreed that the definition of 
acts committed by public officials should be expanded 
to cover acts committed by, or at the instigation of, or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
any other person acting in an official capacity.204 
                                                                                                  
addition of a non-refoulement provision, which was inspired by the European case 
law. Id. at 35. 
203.  Id. at 38–46. 
204.  Id. at 45–46. To the extent Burgers and Danelius imply that only 
France favored covering private actors in all cases, their summary is inaccurate. 
The Working Group’s report notes that some delegates took the view that the 
definition of torture “should not be restricted to ‘public officials’ . . . [but] should be 
made applicable to all individuals under the jurisdiction of a contracting State,” 
while others expressed a contrasting view that torture by private actors “should 
be covered by existing or future national law, and that international action was 
primarily designed to cover situations where national action was otherwise least 
likely.” The report adds that the addition of “consent or acquiescence” was 
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The authors inferred from this drafting history that “the rather wide 
phrase” adopted in compromise should cover situations “where the 
responsibility of the authorities is somehow engaged” but not purely 
private actions where “it can be expected that the normal machinery 
of justice will operate and that prosecution and punishment will 
follow under the normal operation of the domestic legal system.”205 
That, of course, raises the question of when the authorities 
should be regarded as “somehow” responsible for private parties’ 
torturous actions. The compromise language that was adopted left the 
answer unclear.206 In a pathbreaking 1994 article on domestic 
violence as torture, Rhonda Copelon pointed out that where legal 
sanctions are absent or insufficiently enforced, the assumption the 
torture definition rests on––that it can be expected that a country’s 
domestic legal system will adequately deal with private criminal 
                                                                                                  
“designed to satisfy those delegates who sought a broad definition of torture, 
which covered both public and private individuals” as well as those in the other 
camp. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Working Group on a Draft Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, ¶¶ 17–18, 23–25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1470 (Mar. 12, 1979) 
[hereinafter 1979 Working Group Report]. In comments offered at various other 
times during the CAT’s drafting, a number of States expressed the view that 
torture should be defined to include private acts regardless of whether the State 
can be deemed responsible. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 174, at 34–36. 
205.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119–20; see also id. at 1 
(stating that the Convention “only relates to practices that occur under some sort 
of responsibility of public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity”). 
Other material in the travaux indicates that the addition of the phrase “or other 
person acting in an official capacity” similarly represented a compromise between 
those taking the view that “public official” should be broadened to include non-
State actors who wield effective, government-like authority over others, and those 
who viewed the term more narrowly. Id. at 45–46; see also Samuel L. David, A 
Foul Immigration Policy, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 785–89 (2003) 
(discussing this aspect of the drafting history); Pnina Baruh Sharvit, The 
Definition of Torture in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. 
RTS. 147, 166 (1993) (noting the Convention’s lack of clarity on whether it covers 
torture carried out by non-State political entities such as guerillas). 
206.  See Yuval Ginbar, Making Human Rights Sense of the Torture 
Definition, in TORTURE AND ITS DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, 
at 273, 281–82 (observing that even though the CAT’s drafters had the situation 
of state detention primarily in mind, they chose “quite wide” language on official 
responsibility that allowed for development of the due diligence approach); 
McCorquodale & La Forgia, supra note 73, at 206 (arguing that the absence of a 
clear definition of acquiescence under the CAT warrants adopting the approach to 
State responsibility developed under other human rights treaties). 
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acts––has not been fulfilled. The State thus bears some responsibility 
for the resulting impunity.207 Other commentators have similarly 
noted that the drafters’ rationale for limiting the torture definition to 
situations where officials could be considered to bear some 
responsibility supports defining “acquiescence” with reference to 
whether officials properly fulfill the functions of a domestic legal 
system by taking all reasonable preventive and prosecutorial 
measures.208 Even if a due diligence obligation was not expressly 
contemplated by the CAT’s drafters, it is consistent with the 
reasoning behind the compromise they reached. 
But there is more. Prior scholarship and judicial discussions 
have overlooked important evidence from the CAT’s drafting history 
which shows that when the United States proposed adding 
“acquiescence” to the torture definition it expressly tied the concept to 
the idea that officials have a legal responsibility under the CAT to 
take appropriate preventive measures to counter all acts of torture of 
which they are aware, no matter who commits them.209 
When the Working Group began meeting in 1978, it had 
before it two initial drafts, one submitted by the International 
                                                                                                  
207.  Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic 
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 299, 342–44, 355–56 
(1994). 
208.  Commentators have linked acquiescence to a State’s failure to fulfill 
the drafters’ expectation that domestic legal systems will adequately deal with 
acts of private torture. See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446–47; INGELSE, supra 
note 174, at 225; Jane McAdam, Part III—Rights and Remedies: The Convention 
Against Torture Alternative Asylum Mechanisms, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 627, 
630–31 (2004); Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to their Convention Obligations: 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad 
Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 304 (2003); CAMILLE 
GIFFORD, HUM. RTS. CTR., UNIV. OF ESSEX, THE TORTURE REPORTING HANDBOOK 
21 (2000); David Weissbrodt & Isabel Höreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement 
Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 51–52 (1999). 
209.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, when it adopted the “willful 
blindness” standard, cited the original U.S. proposal to support its conclusion that 
acquiescence does not require actual knowledge of torturous activity. It did not 
address the aspect of the U.S. proposal discussed here—how it shows that 
acquiescence was meant to go beyond willful blindness and encompass failures by 
officials to take appropriate preventive measures. Silva-Renfigo v. Att’y Gen., 473 
F.3d 58, 68 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Association of Penal Law (IAPL), and the other the previously-
mentioned Swedish draft.210 The IAPL draft contained a definition of 
torture that reached not only acts committed “by or at the instigation” 
of a public official, but also acts “for which a public official is 
responsible,” defined in a separate Article to include situations where 
an official who is aware of torturous activity “fails to take appropriate 
measures to prevent or suppress torture . . . and has the authority or 
is in a position to take such measures.”211 
In comments submitted in advance of the Working Group’s 
1979 session, the United States proposed modifying Sweden’s draft by 
adding “consent or acquiescence” to the torture definition. The 
purpose of this change, the United States explained, was “so that 
public officials have a clear duty to act to prevent torture.” It added 
that “[t]his duty is further elaborated in the new article 2 proposed by 
the United States.”212 The United States’ proposed Article 2 was 
closely modeled on the IAPL’s article on official responsibility. It 
provided that any public official who “fails to take appropriate 
measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has 
knowledge or should have knowledge that torture has or is being 
committed and has the authority or is in the position to take such 
measures” is responsible within the meaning of the Convention.213 
When the Working Group resumed its meetings in 1979, it 
had before it the United States’ written comments as well as two 
revised drafts prepared by Sweden and the International Commission 
                                                                                                  
210.  See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 26, 31, 34–38; see also id. 
at 197 (reprinting the IAPL draft), 203 (reprinting the original Swedish draft). 
Some elements of the IAPL draft were later incorporated into the revised Swedish 
draft that became the basis for the Working Group’s deliberations on the treaty’s 
text. Id. at 26; see also RODLEY, supra note 148, at 48 (noting the IAPL draft may 
well have influenced Sweden’s proposals). 
211.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 197. A regional Inter-
American torture treaty finalized shortly after the CAT took an approach similar 
to the IAPL draft by including an Article that extended responsibility for torture 
to a public official who “being able to prevent it, fails to do so.” Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1985, art. 
3(a), O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987). It also defined torture 
without reference to any degree of State involvement, thereby obligating State 
parties to take “effective measures to prevent and punish” torturous acts 
committed by private parties. Id. arts. 2, 6. 
212.  Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summary prepared by the Secretary-General 
in accordance with Commission resolution 18 (XXXIV), ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1314 (Dec. 19, 1978). 
213.  Id. ¶ 45. 
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of Jurists, both of which incorporated the United States’ proposed 
“consent or acquiescence” wording into their torture definitions, but 
did not include the additional U.S.-proposed article concerning the 
scope of officials’ responsibility.214 The Working Group’s records offer 
no explanation for the failure to take up the additional provision on 
the scope of officials’ responsibility, but the decision could be 
explained by the fact that both the original and revised Swedish 
drafts already included, in Article 2, a broad requirement that States 
take effective measures to prevent acts of torture in their 
territories.215 A separate article stating that officials are responsible if 
they fail to take appropriate preventive measures may have seemed 
redundant. 
Another aspect of the drafting history, also overlooked in 
prior scholarship, lends additional support to reading “acquiescence” 
to encompass a duty of due diligence. The Committee Against 
Torture’s General Comment No. 2 defines acquiescence in relation to 
officials’ failure to fulfill Article 2’s duty to take effective measures to 
prevent acts of torture and/or some of the more specific obligations set 
out in subsequent articles.216 The case for linking acquiescence to 
those duties is more convincing if those articles of the CAT can be 
fairly read to obligate States to take effective measures to prevent 
torturous activity by non-State actors, without regard to whether 
public officials acquiesce or are otherwise responsible. Otherwise, 
there is a certain circularity to tying acquiescence to the Article 2 
requirement of effective measures to prevent acts of torture—it 
amounts to saying that in order to avoid acquiescing, the State must 
take effective measures to prevent acts to which its officials 
acquiesce.217 
                                                                                                  
214.  See 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 204, ¶¶ 11–13, 16; see 
also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 39–44 (discussing the Working 
Group’s deliberations), 208 (reprinting the revised Swedish draft). 
215.  See 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 204, ¶¶ 17–18, 23–25, 30–
36; see also Ahcene Boulesbaa, Analysis and Proposals for the Rectification of the 
Ambiguities Inherent in Article 1 of the U.N. Convention on Torture, 5 FLA. INT’L 
L.J. 293, 313–15 (1990) (suggesting that the IAPL’s provision on official 
responsibility may be helpful in interpreting the CAT’s ambiguous language 
regarding when torture by private actors is covered). 
216.  See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
217.  The duty can be conceived of in that way—one member of the 
Committee Against Torture has characterized Article 2 as creating an obligation 
to ensure that officials do not acquiesce to torture by failing to take effective 
measures to stop acts committed by non-State parties that, if acquiesced to by 
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There is, in fact, a basis in the CAT’s text for reading the 
phrase “acts of torture,” which is the phrase used (as opposed to 
simply “torture”) in Article 2 and several other key articles that 
require preventive or remedial measures, to indicate that those duties 
extend to acts of torture by non-State actors, even in the absence of 
official acquiescence.218 Article 1’s definition of torture, as U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Nils Melzer observed, consists of a “substantive 
component” defining the conduct that amounts to torture followed by 
an “attributive component” that defines the level of State involvement 
needed to trigger the State’s responsibility as a matter of 
international law.219 The phrase “act of torture” can reasonably be 
read to refer only to the substantive component of Article 1’s torture 
definition—the part defining the act—and not its final phrase, 
“when . . . inflicted by or . . . with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official,” which does not concern the act but rather when the 
State will be deemed responsible for it.220 
                                                                                                  
State officials, amount to torture. See Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of Torture: 
The Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 CUNY L. REV. 293, 297–98 
(2012). But that is a complex way of looking at it, and the link between 
acquiescence and State failure to fulfill Article 2’s preventive duty is more 
intuitively appealing if Article 2 can be read to directly require officials to take 
effective measures against all known torturous activity, regardless of whether 
officials bear any responsibility for it. 
218.  The phrases “acts of torture” or “act of torture” are used in Article 2 
(duty to take effective measures to prevent acts of torture in territories under the 
State’s jurisdiction), Article 4 (duty to ensure all acts of torture are offenses under 
criminal law), Articles 12–13 (duties to promptly and impartially investigate and 
protect complainants and witnesses against retaliation), and Article 14 (duty to 
ensure the right to redress in the legal system). Certain other provisions instead 
refer to “torture”: Article 3 (non-refoulement to another State where a person 
faces “danger of being subjected to torture”), and Article 15 (inadmissibility of 
statements made as a result of torture). 
219.  2019 Special Rapporteur Rep., supra note 180, ¶¶ 5–6. 
220.  The Committee Against Torture, in its comments on State party 
reports, appears to read “acts of torture” in that manner when it faults countries 
for not criminalizing, investigating, or otherwise effectively countering torturous 
conduct by non-State actors. See, e.g., Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture—Albania, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/ALB (June 
21, 2005) (criticizing authorities’ reluctance to adopt measures to counter 
domestic and sexual violence and to promptly and impartially investigate such 
incidents); Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture—Cameroon, ¶¶ 7(b)–(c), 11(c)–(d), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/31/6 (Feb. 11, 
2004) (faulting the absence of legislation banning female genital mutilation and 
an exemption from punishment for rape if the rapist marries the victim); 
EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 218 (describing several other examples); see also 
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The evolution of the CAT’s text lends support to that reading. 
In the 1975 U.N. Declaration, every time the phrase “acts of torture” 
appeared, it was qualified with additional language (“acts of torture 
as defined in article 1” or “acts of torture . . . committed by or at the 
instigation of a public official”) to indicate that it referred only to 
those torturous acts for which the State was responsible.221 Sweden’s 
initial 1978 draft of the treaty retained most of that qualifying 
language.222 However, the revised Swedish draft of 1979, which 
incorporated the U.S.-proposed “consent or acquiescence” language, 
dropped all prior qualifiers that had restricted the meaning of “acts of 
torture.”223 This was consistent with the tenor of the U.S. 
acquiescence proposal, which was predicated on the idea that officials 
have a duty to take appropriate preventive measures when they know 
or have reason to know of acts of torture by private parties. 
Two other arguments that might be made in defense of 
restricting “acquiescence” to acts committed with the authorities’ 
tacit approval can be briefly disposed of. One concerns the fact that 
the torture definition covers only pain or suffering intentionally 
inflicted “for such purposes as” obtaining information or a confession, 
punishing for an actual or suspected act, intimidating or coercing the 
person or a third party, “or for any reason based on discrimination of 
                                                                                                  
Josephine A. Vining, Providing Protection from Torture by “Unofficial” Actors, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 331, 344–45 (2004) (noting that broad wording of Article 2 
supports an official obligation to prevent and punish all acts of torture, including 
those by non-State actors). But see Paola Gaeta, When is the Involvement of State 
Officials a Requirement for the Crime of Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 183, 190–
91 (2008) (arguing the CAT requires countries to criminalize only torture that 
occurs with official involvement or acquiescence to avoid excessive international 
intrusion into domestic criminal matters). 
221.  Declaration, supra note 195, arts. 7, 9–11. 
222.  Original Swedish Draft, supra note 202, arts. 7, 9, 11. 
223.  Revised text of the substantive parts of the Draft Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
submitted by Sweden on 19 February 1979, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1, 
reprinted in BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 208. The revised Swedish 
draft also introduced the phrase “prevent acts of torture” into Article 2. The 
predecessor Articles in the U.N. Declaration and the original Swedish draft spoke 
of a State duty to prevent “torture,” a term that would take its meaning from the 
entire torture definition, not just its substantive component. Cf. id. at 192 (arts. 
3–4 of the Declaration), 203 (art. 2 of the Original Swedish Draft), 208 (art. 2 of 
the Revised Swedish Draft). 
800 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
any kind.”224 Burgers and Danelius viewed the listed purposes as 
having in common “the existence of some—even remote—connection 
with the interests or policies of the State and its organs.”225 Private 
actors who inflict torture against the State’s wishes cannot be said to 
be acting to further the State’s policies or interests. But the CAT’s 
listing of purposes just as easily describes the motivations of private 
torture. Gangs employ violence to coerce, intimidate, or punish; 
attacks on racial minorities or LGBTQI people, and practices like 
female genital cutting and honor killings, are based on 
discrimination; and domestic violence and rape are inflicted to coerce, 
intimidate, and punish, in addition to being rooted in gender 
discrimination.226 Privately-inflicted acts easily satisfy the torture 
definition’s purpose requirement.227 
Another requirement often read into the CAT’s torture 
definition—although appearing nowhere in the treaty’s text—is that 
the victim must be detained or otherwise under the control of the 
                                                                                                  
224.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1. It is important to bear in mind that this 
purpose requirement applies to the person actually inflicting the pain or suffering. 
There is no requirement that a public official who acquiesces to the act of torture 
be motivated by one of these purposes. See Walker v. Lynch, 657 F. App’x. 45, 47–
48 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding BIA erred in finding no acquiescence because Jamaican 
officials’ failure to investigate anti-gay attacks had not been shown to be 
purposeful and based on the victims’ sexuality); see also Cherichel v. Holder, 591 
F.3d 1002, 1013 n.14 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “it is the torturer who must 
possess the specific intent to inflict severe . . . pain or suffering, not necessarily 
the state actor”); Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding the 
same). 
225.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 118–19; see also Rodley, supra 
note 201, at 484–85 (stating that the list of purposes in the torture definition 
reflects “the purposes of an organized political entity exercising effective power” 
and indicates that the typical torturer will be an official or someone acting to 
further state purposes). 
226.  See Copelon, supra note 207, at 329–40. 
227.  The Canadian CAT guidelines point out that Burgers and Danelius’ 
view that the purpose element is linked to State interests or policies “is difficult to 
reconcile with the other purposes, which are not explicitly concerned with the 
maintenance and exercise or state power, but merely with the exercise of power or 
control over the victim.” CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 45–46; see also 
Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US and UN Standards, 28 
HUM. RTS. Q. 809, 830–32 (2008) (accepting that the CAT’s purposes bear a 
relation to State interests but pointing out that at their core, the listed purposes 
presuppose a situation of a perpetrator exercising control over a powerless victim); 
Rosati, supra note 12, at 542–43 (noting that purposes such as “intimidation” and 
“coercion” are so broad “almost any reason for intentional torture would fall 
within” them). 
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person inflicting the harm. Burgers and Danelius saw this as a 
necessary corollary of the CAT’s purpose and drafting history; 
otherwise, they argued, coercive but legitimate uses of force by a 
nation’s police or military while making arrests, quelling violence, or 
defending the country could be considered acts of torture.228 The U.S. 
ratification resolution explicitly provided that “the United States 
understands that the definition of torture in Article 1 is intended to 
apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender’s custody or 
physical control.”229 If this limited the torture definition to persons in 
official custody, it would mean that few if any private acts, other than 
prisoner-on-prisoner violence, would be covered. But the restriction 
cannot be read in that way because the reference is not to an official’s 
custody or control, but rather to the offender’s.230 Torturous acts, 
whether committed by an official or a non-State actor, and whether 
occurring within or outside a detention facility, nearly always take 
place while the victim is under the perpetrator’s physical control or 
custody and prevented from leaving by force or threats.231 
The CAT’s text, context, purpose, and drafting history offer 
ample support for an interpretation that ties acquiescence to breach 
of officials’ duty to act diligently and take effective measures to 
prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture, including 
                                                                                                  
228.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 120–21; see also Nowak, supra 
note 227, at 832–33 (arguing that torture under the CAT “presupposes a situation 
of powerlessness of the victim” and does not include justifiable uses of force while 
making arrests or preventing escape). 
229.  136 Cong. Rec. 36,198–99 (1990); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(6) 
(2020) (codifying the Senate understanding in immigration regulations). 
230.  The BIA, in a decision that addressed whether atrocious detention 
conditions in Haiti amounted to torture, erroneously listed as one of the torture 
definition’s elements that the acts must be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical 
control of the victim.” Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (B.I.A. 2002). In the 
sole reported case where the BIA rejected a CAT claim on the ground that the 
feared conduct (genital cutting) would not occur under State officials’ custody or 
control, its decision was vacated by an appeals court because the Senate 
understanding and regulation are clearly satisfied where a person “would likely 
suffer torture while under private parties’ exclusive custody or physical control.” 
Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2004). 
231.  See, e.g., V.L. v. Switzerland, No. 262/2005, ¶ 8.10, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 (Nov. 20, 2006) (finding that when the complainant was 
raped she clearly was under the physical control of her rapists—in this case police 
officers—even though the rapes occurred outside of detention facilities). One can 
imagine rare exceptions including, for example, a person shot at a distance by a 
sniper. 
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those committed by non-State actors. That reading is most consistent 
with the rationale behind the compromise reached by the drafters, 
which excluded purely private torture from the torture definition 
based on the assumption that “prosecution and punishment will 
follow under the normal operation of the domestic legal system.”232 
The due diligence approach identifies those circumstances in which 
that assumption is not fulfilled. The due diligence standard also 
accords with what the United States indicated it meant by 
acquiescence when it proposed adding the term to the CAT’s torture 
definition. Moreover, it has the virtue of making the CAT congruent 
with how private torture is treated under other human rights 
instruments, consistent with the CAT’s stated objective of making the 
enforcement of the already existing prohibition of torture in 
international law more effective.233 
III. THE UNITED STATES’ RATIFICATION UNDERSTANDING: 
INCORPORATING STATE PREVENTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Senate’s ratification understanding, which, as Congress 
directed in FARRA, was incorporated into U.S. immigration 
regulations, defines acquiescence to require that an official have 
“awareness” of torturous activity and “thereafter breach his legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”234 Although the 
legislative history addresses what was meant by “awareness,”235 it 
does not discuss whether “legal responsibility” was meant to include 
                                                                                                  
232.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119–20. 
233.  To the extent doubt remains, the protective purpose of Article 3 of the 
CAT, which is meant to safeguard against deporting people to places where they 
would face grievous harm, also counsels in favor of a broad construction of the 
term “acquiescence.” Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) 
(discussing the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” especially where “death or persecution” 
is at stake); see also Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of 
Victim Protection Under the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 801–
05 (2009) (arguing that Article 3’s protective purpose warrants putting a greater 
focus on the harm faced by the individual than the government actor’s 
culpability). 
234.  136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (2020) (worded 
identically except “his” was changed to “his or her”); see generally supra Section 
I.A. 
235.  As discussed in Section I.A, the drafters chose the word “awareness” to 
indicate that actual knowledge is not needed and willful blindness suffices. 
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obligations arising under international law or only duties imposed by 
the laws of the official’s country.236 But, as this Part shows, a 
preponderance of the textual and contextual clues favor looking to 
international as well as domestic law. That is also how the INS, the 
agency charged with implementation, understood the acquiescence 
understanding in the first authoritative guidance it issued on the 
subject.237 
When the text of a draft Convention was completed in 1984, 
the U.N. Secretary-General forwarded it to all governments to invite 
their comments in advance of the General Assembly vote.238 The 
statement submitted by the United States made a point of standing 
by all the interpretive positions it had taken during the negotiations: 
Representatives of the United States Government 
participated actively throughout the sessions of the 
Working Group . . . . During the course of these 
negotiations, [they] made a number of declarations 
and interpretive statements which are contained in 
the official records of the negotiations, a part of the 
legislative history of the convention. The United 
States, in expressing its support for the draft 
convention and for approval of it by the United 
Nations General Assembly, maintains all of the 
declarations and interpretive statements made on its 
behalf throughout the course of the negotiations.239 
One of those interpretive positions, as we have seen, was that 
the phrase “consent or acquiescence” should be added to the torture 
definition “so that public officials have a clear duty to act to prevent 
torture” in accordance with an obligation arising under the CAT to 
take appropriate measures within their power to suppress any 
torture of which they become aware.240  
                                                                                                  
236.  See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446 (noting that the U.S. 
understanding did not “specify to what legal responsibilities it referred”); Rosati, 
supra note 12, at 538 (same). 
237.  See infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text (discussing a 1997 
memo issued by the agency’s General Counsel, David A. Martin). 
238.  See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 99–102. 
239.  U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at 20, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/39/499 (Oct. 2, 1984) 
(containing replies received from governments, including the U.S., to comment on 
the draft Convention) [hereinafter 1984 U.S. Statement]. 
240.  Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in 
Accordance with Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), ¶¶ 29, 45, U.N. Doc. 
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The 1984 statement went on to specifically mention, as an 
example of the interpretive stances maintained by the United States, 
its view that international law must be considered when interpreting 
another key phrase in the torture definition. Article 1 of the CAT 
includes a sentence providing that torture “does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.”241 The United States reminded other countries of its 
position that “[t]he reference to ‘lawful sanctions’ . . . must be 
understood to mean sanctions which are lawful under both national 
and international law.”242 
When the State Department transmitted the CAT to the 
Senate in 1988, it backtracked on this issue, likely due to concerns 
expressed by the Justice Department.243 The Reagan Administration 
package of ratification conditions included a number of 
understandings aimed at protecting law enforcement interests, 
among them one providing that “lawful sanctions” include “not only 
judicially-imposed sanctions but also other enforcement actions 
authorized by U.S. law or by judicial interpretations of such law.”244 
This implied that the question of whether a sanction is lawful, and 
                                                                                                  
E/CN.4/1314 (Dec. 19, 1978); see generally supra notes 209–15 and accompanying 
text. 
241.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
242.  1984 U.S. Statement, supra note 239, at 21, ¶ 5. The CAT’s drafting 
history indicates that State parties could not agree on the “lawful sanctions” 
exception’s scope and therefore “left open whether this exception refers only to the 
contents of national law or whether a sanction, in order to be lawful, must also 
comply with certain international humanitarian standards.” BURGERS & 
DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 47. 
243.  See President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at v–vi (letter from 
Secretary of State George Shultz referencing the Department of Justice’s approval 
of the proposed ratification conditions); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at 453 
(“Most of the problems [the CAT] posed with respect to U.S. ratification turned on 
the manner in which the Convention affected law enforcement interests.”). 
244.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5. The package also 
contained provisions—later dropped or greatly modified by the Bush 
Administration—that would have limited the torture definition to “extremely 
cruel” acts “specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or 
mental pain or suffering,” allowed “relevant common law defenses” to charges of 
torture, and refused to recognize the Committee Against Torture’s competence to 
investigate charges of systematic torture in the United States or hear any 
complaints made against the United States by other countries or individuals. Id. 
at 4–7, 17; see also Senate Report, supra note 4, at 35–38 (reprinting 1989 State 
Department letter to Senator Pell containing the Bush Administration’s revised 
ratification conditions and explaining reasons for changes). 
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therefore exempt from the definition of torture, was to be determined 
solely by reference to domestic, not international law. 
The proposed acquiescence understanding, in contrast, 
referred to an official’s “legal responsibility” with no qualifying 
language to suggest that the term was limited to domestic legal 
duties. The words chosen (“have knowledge of such activity and 
thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such 
activity”245) also presuppose that an official has such a legal 
responsibility, the existence of which does not depend on the vagaries 
of any one country’s laws. This wording is consistent with the stance 
taken by the United States in the treaty negotiations that officials 
have a legal responsibility under the CAT to take appropriate 
measures to counter known acts of torture, and are deemed to 
acquiesce when they fail to do so.246 
The subsequent history of the Reagan “lawful sanctions” 
proposal also points toward looking to the CAT and international law 
as sources of official obligation. The effort to exempt all enforcement 
actions authorized by U.S. law from the definition of torture drew 
criticism from human rights groups for creating a loophole that 
undermined the treaty. Its logic would have allowed States to impose 
torturous punishments like flogging or amputation so long as the 
country’s laws authorized them. The Bush Administration agreed 
with this critique and in its 1989 revised package of conditions added 
the phrase, “provided that such sanctions or actions are not clearly 
prohibited under international law.”247 This was further amended on 
the Senate floor to read: “Nonetheless, the United States understands 
that a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the 
object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.”248 
                                                                                                  
245.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5; see also supra note 52 and 
accompanying text (reprinting complete text of the Reagan-proposed acquiescence 
understanding). 
246.  See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446 (noting that the U.S. 
ratification understanding reflected the way in which the U.S. had developed the 
term during the drafting of the Convention). 
247.  See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 10; Senate Report, supra note 4, 
at 5–6, 35–36; Stewart, supra note 43, at 457. 
248.  136 Cong. Rec. 36,192–99 (1990). This amendment was facilitated by 
Senator Pell, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 
consultation with the Bush Administration in order to placate Senator Jesse 
Helms, the Committee’s ranking Republican, who was averse to having U.S. 
legislation cite international law because of concerns about sovereignty and the 
primacy of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 36,193–94; Senate Hearing, supra note 45, 
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The Bush Administration never altered the “legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent torture” language of the 
proposed acquiescence understanding. The only change it made was 
to broaden it by changing the word “knowledge” to “awareness.”249 
The same concerns that led the Bush Administration to clarify that 
sanctions must be consistent with international law in order to be 
lawful would have counseled against limiting “legal responsibility” in 
the acquiescence understanding to domestic legal duties. Making 
acquiescence dependent on a violation of national law would allow 
countries to absolve themselves of all responsibility for acts of private 
torture simply by providing in their laws that officials have no legal 
obligation to intervene. And it would allow an individual to be 
deported to face torture in a country where officials would do nothing 
to prevent it, so long as that country’s laws do not require officials to 
do anything. Such an interpretation would undermine the CAT’s 
object and purpose, and render “acquiescence” all but meaningless. 
When the Bush Administration presented its revised package 
of ratification conditions to Congress in late 1989, the State 
Department was undoubtedly aware that international law had been 
interpreted to impose duties on public officials to take effective 
measures to prevent private acts of torture. The U.N. Human Rights 
Committee’s 1982 general comment on the ICCPR and the much 
publicized 1988 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in Velásquez Rodríguez pointed strongly in the direction of a 
due diligence obligation.250 The Bush Administration was attuned to 
the risk that international tribunals might interpret the CAT in a 
way unacceptable to the United States and sought safeguards where 
it had such concerns. The original Reagan Administration package 
included an understanding providing that Article 16’s prohibition of 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT) covered only cruel 
and unusual treatment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.251 The 
Bush Administration reclassified it as a formal reservation which, 
unlike an understanding, restricted the legal obligations that the U.S. 
                                                                                                  
at 42. It probably escaped Helms’s attention that the reference to “legal 
responsibility” in the acquiescence understanding was broad enough to cover 
international law; or perhaps he was willing to tolerate some ambiguity as long as 
the hated words were not used. 
249.   See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. 
250.  See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text. 
251.   President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 15–16. 
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would assume in ratifying the treaty.252 In testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, officials drew specific attention 
to decisions of human rights tribunals condemning treatment the 
United States considered constitutionally acceptable,253 especially the 
European Court of Human Rights’ 1989 Soering decision, which 
blocked the extradition of a man charged with murder to the U.S. on 
the ground that he faced the prospect of years on death row, an 
inhuman or degrading treatment.254 
By contrast, the Administration expressed no concerns about 
overbroad international interpretations of officials’ legal 
responsibility to prevent torturous activity, despite the prominent 
and recent international jurisprudence finding that officials had a 
legal duty to take effective measures against torture by non-State 
actors. Nor was the acquiescence understanding made into a 
reservation. This suggests that the Bush Administration viewed its 
approach to acquiescence as consistent with international law and 
had no objection to the emerging due diligence jurisprudence.255 The 
                                                                                                  
252.  Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8, 36; see also Stewart, supra note 43, 
at 460–61, n.40 (noting that the change was made because the “intended legal 
effect was in fact to restrict” U.S. obligations under the treaty). 
253.  See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 5–6, 11, 18, 39 (statements and 
testimony of State Dep’t Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer and Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen. Mark Richard); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at 460–62 (discussing 
Administration concerns that broad international interpretations of CIDT would 
conflict with U.S. practices, such as death row and the death penalty). 
254.  Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, ¶ 88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
July 7, 1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
255.  In 2008, years after the United States ratified the CAT, the George W. 
Bush Administration submitted a document to the Committee Against Torture 
that took issue with various aspects of the Committee’s recently issued General 
Comment No. 2, including its statement that failure to respond to private torture 
with due diligence constitutes “acquiescence.” Observations by the United States 
of America on Committee Against Torture General Comment No. 2: 
Implementation of Article 2 by States’ Parties ¶¶ 20–21 (Nov. 3, 2008). These 
comments came at a time of significant tension between the United States and the 
international community over the torture and mistreatment of detainees held by 
military and intelligence agencies at “black site” locations outside U.S. territory. 
See id. ¶¶ 26–28 (disagreeing with the Committee’s view that the CAT creates a 
duty to prevent torture in all places where a State exercises de facto control). 
Under the Obama Administration, the State Department’s Office of the Legal 
Adviser disavowed several of the prior Administration’s positions that purported 
to limit the scope of U.S. obligations under the CAT. See Koh, supra note 183, at 
1–6, 43–56, 66–73, 85–90. In any event, the George W. Bush Administration’s 
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State and Justice Department officials who testified before the Senate 
stressed that most of the U.S. understandings furthered the CAT’s 
aims and “will favorably affect the evolution of the concept of torture 
under international law.”256 When the United States deposited its 
instrument of ratification with the United Nations, several other 
countries that had ratified the treaty objected to the U.S. reservation 
on the scope of CIDT and to a U.S. understanding narrowly 
construing when mental pain and suffering amounts to torture, but 
none objected to the acquiescence understanding.257 A number of 
commentators viewed it as taking a broad approach to acquiescence 
that would be helpful internationally in clarifying the meaning of the 
term.258 
But even if the U.S. officials who proposed the acquiescence 
understanding did not anticipate that due diligence would become the 
international law standard for State responsibility, this ultimately 
should make no difference in how the unrestricted phrase “legal 
responsibility” in the acquiescence understanding is interpreted. 
Legal responsibilities exist under international law as well as 
domestic law and the Senate understanding did not exclude the 
former. As the Supreme Court recently noted in applying Title VII to 
                                                                                                  
positions shed no useful light on the intent of the George H.W. Bush 
Administration and the Senate at the time the United States ratified the CAT in 
1990. 
256.  Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 13, 16, 39 (testimony and prepared 
statement of Mark Richard, and testimony of Abraham Sofaer). The Justice 
Department’s testimony was delivered by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
from the Criminal Division who explained that his agency’s concerns all related to 
the need to clarify the torture definition so that the United States could meet its 
treaty obligation to make all acts of torture criminally punishable without 
running afoul of due process constraints. Id. at 1–16. With respect to 
acquiescence, that meant ensuring that officials could not be held accountable 
unless they had prior awareness of torturous activity (through actual knowledge 
or willful blindness) and breached a legal responsibility to intervene. Id. at 14, 17. 
The Justice Department did not express any concerns about the source or scope of 
that legal responsibility. 
257.  See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to 
Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 807 (2012) 
(summarizing all objections made to the U.S. reservations and understandings). 
258.  For examples of scholars who regarded the U.S. acquiescence 
understanding as progressive, see WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446; Alexander, 
supra note 14, at 937; Rosati, supra note 12, at 539; and Magee, supra note 45, at 
830–31. But see NOWAK ET AL., supra note 174, at 40–41 (viewing all the U.S. 
understandings, including the one on acquiescence, as inappropriate efforts to 
limit the torture definition’s scope). 
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sexual orientation discrimination, statutes are not limited to 
applications that were expected at the time of enactment and “[w]hen 
Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts 
should apply the broad rule.”259 
The ratification history includes two statements that might 
be read to cut against a broad conception of the legal responsibilities 
referenced in the Senate understanding. Viewed in context, however, 
they do not support excluding obligations arising under international 
law. A prepared statement submitted by the Justice Department at 
the Senate hearing observed that the acquiescence understanding 
“reflects an intention that the criminal sanctions contained in the 
Convention for action constituting torture be focused on knowing 
misconduct as opposed to negligent inaction.”260 That remark was 
consistent with the Department’s view that Article 4 of the CAT, 
which requires States to criminalize “complicity or participation in 
torture” as well as actual or attempted torturous acts, does not 
require criminalizing negligent inaction.261 The Reagan and Bush 
Administrations repeatedly assured the Senate that existing state 
and federal criminal laws were sufficient to comply with Article 4 
because they covered conspiracies as well as any actual or attempted 
acts of torture.262 Whatever acquiescence means, it is clearly broader 
than conspiracy. The Reagan and Bush Administrations’ stance that 
existing criminal laws fulfilled U.S. obligations under Article 4 
indicates that they viewed the treaty as requiring criminal sanctions 
                                                                                                  
259.  Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736 (2020). 
260.  Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 17 (prepared statement of Mark 
Richard). This may have been meant to refer to the “awareness” element of 
acquiescence, which can be established by willful blindness, a form of knowing 
misconduct, but not by a merely negligent lack of knowledge. See supra notes 58–
59, 109 and accompanying text. 
261.  Article 4, paragraph 1 provides: “Each State Party shall ensure that 
all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an 
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.” Paragraph 2 further requires that States 
“make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account 
their grave nature.” CAT, supra note 1, art. 4 ¶ 1. 
262.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 8–9 (State Department 
analysis of Article 4); Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 15, 40 (prepared 
statement and testimony of Mark Richard). Although asserting that existing U.S. 
criminal laws sufficiently covered acts taking place on U.S. territory, the 
Administration acknowledged a new federal statute would be needed to cover 
some extraterritorial conduct, as required by Article 5 of the CAT. President’s 
Transmittal, supra note 42, at 10. 
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for “complicity” but not acquiescence.263 It does not follow that 
officials’ negligent inaction could never breach a legal responsibility 
and amount to acquiescence. 
Another statement, contained in the State Department 
analysis that accompanied the CAT’s transmittal to the Senate, 
makes reference to acts that occur “under color of law,” a term of art 
drawn from civil rights law that denotes action occurring with 
significant State involvement or aid:264 
The scope of the Convention is limited to torture 
“inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.” Thus, the Convention 
applies only to torture that occurs in the context of 
governmental authority, excluding torture that occurs 
as a wholly private act or, in terms more familiar in 
U.S. law, it applies to torture inflicted “under color of 
law.’”265 
Read in context, however, the “under color of law” analogy in 
this passage is used to explain what the phrase “acting in an official 
capacity” means and not as a definition of “acquiescence.” In other 
words, the person who inflicts, instigates, consents to, or acquiesces 
in the act of torture must be acting “under color of law.” If so, the 
requisite “context of governmental authority” is present. The 
Attorney General and courts have interpreted the torture definition 
in that way, treating “under color of law” as the operative test for 
determining whether someone is “acting in an official capacity.”266 
That is a distinct inquiry from whether that person’s response to the 
torturous conduct amounts to “consent or acquiescence.” 
                                                                                                  
263.  Cf. Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, Criminalisation of Torture: State 
Obligations Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 115, 124–25 (noting that Article 4 does not expressly link “complicity” with 
Article 1’s “consent or acquiescence” and it is unclear “whether every individual 
public official sufficiently involved under Art. 1 so as to make the state 
responsible would in all cases become individually criminally responsible”). 
264.  See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A private 
individual acts under color of law . . . when he acts together with state officials or 
with significant state aid.” (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 
(1982))). 
265.  President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 4. 
266.  See Matter of O-F-A-S-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35, 39, 41–42 (A.G. 2020); see 
also id. at 37, 39 (citing court decisions that equate “under color of law” with 
action “in an official capacity”). 
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Two statutes enacted after the Senate’s 1990 ratification of 
the CAT used the phrase “under color of law” in identifying 
extraterritorial acts of torture that would be criminally punishable or 
subject to civil damages. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
(TVPA)267 defined torture similarly to the CAT but omitted the CAT 
definition’s language on state responsibility.268 However, in creating a 
cause of action, it restricted liability to acts of torture or extrajudicial 
killing committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, 
of any foreign nation.”269 The Senate Report on the TVPA explains 
that its damage remedy was meant to provide a clearer statutory 
foundation for the cause of action recognized under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS)270 in the 1980 Filartiga decision, which allowed 
noncitizens to sue a former foreign police official in federal district 
court for torturing and killing a family member abroad because 
“customary international law provides individuals with the right to 
be free from torture by government officials.”271 The bill was also 
designed to make the Filartiga cause of action available to U.S. 
citizens who suffer torture abroad.272 Given these purposes, the 
limitation of the damage remedy for State-committed or State-abetted 
                                                                                                  
267.  Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
note). 
268.  Id. § 3(b). The TVPA’s torture definition tracked Article 1 of the CAT 
except for the omission of the treaty language requiring some degree of connection 
to a public official or person acting in an official capacity. It also added in 
language from the Senate ratification understandings that qualified or clarified 
certain other aspects of the definition. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6–7 (1991). 
269.  Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a). 
270.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
271.  S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991) (discussing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 
416 F.3d 1242, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the ATS provides a cause of 
action only for state-sponsored torture and the text of the TVPA likewise 
“expressly requires the element of state action”). 
272.  See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5. Congress may also have viewed state-
sponsored torture as particularly heinous and worthy of punishment. See Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigr. and Refugee Affairs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 17 (1990) [hereinafter TVPA Hearing] (Senator Arlen Specter stating that 
he introduced the bill to provide a federal remedy “for this kind of outrageous and 
horrendous conduct”). There may also have been concerns that allowing suits for 
private torture in which officials acquiesced would have led to too many suits in 
U.S. courts based on extraterritorial conduct.  
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torture (as under the ATS) makes sense and does not suggest that 
Congress viewed “acquiescence” under the CAT in narrow terms.273 
The phrase “under color of law” appeared again in the 1994 
Torture Act,274 which was enacted to implement the United States’ 
obligation under the CAT to criminalize all acts or attempted acts of 
torture and complicity or participation in such acts, not only within 
the United States, but also when committed abroad by a U.S. 
national or by a non-national offender present in the United States.275 
In defining “torture” for purposes of this offense, Congress roughly 
tracked the CAT definition but covered only torture “committed by a 
person acting under color of law,”276 thereby excluding acts committed 
by someone acting in a private capacity but with a public official’s 
acquiescence. The Torture Act makes it a criminal offense to commit 
                                                                                                  
273.  The TVPA’s failure to provide a civil damage remedy for some acts 
committed abroad that would fall within Article 1’s definition of torture did not 
violate U.S. obligations under the CAT. The treaty’s drafting history indicates 
that Article 14, on the victim’s right to compensation, was meant to apply only to 
torture occurring within a country’s territory. When the U.S. ratified the treaty, 
one of the Senate understandings made that limitation explicit. See Resolution of 
Ratification, § II(3), 136 CONG. REC. 36,198–99 (1990) (setting out the U.S. 
understanding that Article 14 requires providing “a private right of action for 
damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of 
that State Party”); TVPA Hearing, supra note 272, at 19 (testimony of David 
Stewart, State Dep’t Assistant Legal Adviser); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at 
458–60 (discussing the Bush Administration’s view that the CAT did not require 
the United States to provide a civil remedy for any acts of torture committed 
abroad). The Senate report on the TVPA asserted that providing a damage 
remedy for some torture committed abroad would help to “carry out the intent” of 
the CAT but did not dispute the point, made by dissenting committee members, 
that the CAT did not require it. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3, 13 (1991); see also S. 
REP. NO. 103-107, at 59 (1993) (stating, in a Senate report on the later-passed 
Torture Act, that “[c]onsistent with the Senate’s understanding pertaining to 
Article 14 of the Convention, the legislation does not create any private right of 
action for acts of torture committed outside the territory of the United States”). 
274.  Pub. L. 103-236, Tit. V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A). Congress later incorporated by reference the 
Torture Act’s definition of torture into a statute creating programs to assist 
victims of torture. Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-320, § 3, 112 
Stat. 3016 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2152 note). The Congressional findings in that 
statute express a special concern with torture used by repressive governments to 
terrorize society as a weapon against democracy. Id. § 2(2)–(3). 
275.  CAT, supra note 1, arts. 4–5; see also United States v. Belfast, 611 
F.3d 783, 802–03 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining the relationship between the 
Torture Act and the CAT). 
276.  18 U.S.C. § 2340. 
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or attempt to commit torture outside the United States or to conspire 
to do so.277 The scope of criminal liability mirrored the view expressed 
by the Executive Branch at the time of ratification that criminalizing 
conspiracy along with actual or attempted acts of torture was enough 
to meet U.S. obligations under Article 4 of the CAT.278 The only 
federal appeals court decision construing the Torture Act found that 
the statute’s “acting under color of law” requirement corresponds to 
and is synonymous with the CAT torture definition’s reference to a 
“person acting in an official capacity.”279 Once again, Congress did not 
use the phrase to define or cabin the meaning of “acquiescence,” a 
concept that it simply chose to exclude from the extraterritorial 
criminal liability statute. 
When Congress enacted FARRA in 1998 to implement Article 
3’s non-refoulement requirement in U.S. immigration law, it did not 
repeat the TVPA and Torture Act’s “under color of law” formulation. 
Instead, it directed agencies to issue regulations giving “torture” and 
other terms the same meaning they hold in the CAT, subject to the 
reservations, understandings, and other provisions of the Senate 
ratification resolution.280 The legislation thus mandated that for 
purposes of relief from removal, torturous conduct by private actors 
falls within the definition of torture if it occurs with the acquiescence 
of a public official or person acting in an official capacity,  with the 
Senate’s understanding providing the definition for “acquiescence.”281 
Congress’ choice not to require a higher degree of state action through 
an “under color of law” standard makes sense both to ensure 
compliance with the treaty and to serve the distinctive purpose of 
Article 3. While the TVPA and Torture Act were designed to impose 
penalties on perpetrators, Congress’s purpose in FARRA was 
protective—to ensure that individuals are not sent to places where 
                                                                                                  
277.  18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (c). 
278.  See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text; Belfast, 611 F.3d at 
811–12 (finding Congress fulfilled Article 4’s obligation to criminalize “complicity 
or participation” in torture when it made conspiracy to commit torture abroad a 
crime). 
279.  Belfast, 611 F.3d at 808–09. 
280.  FARRA, supra note 49, §§ 1242(a), (b), (f)(2). 
281.  Following FARRA, the Justice Department’s CAT regulations 
incorporated the Senate understanding on acquiescence verbatim, except for 
making it gender-neutral by using “he or she.” Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7), 
with Resolution of Ratification, § II(3), 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990). 
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they face a danger of torture.282 A victim-centered standard that 
focuses on the harm faced by the applicant and requires a lesser 
degree of   active State involvement is appropriate to this context.  
This tour of the history of U.S. ratification and subsequent 
legislation leads back to the basic point made earlier—that the U.S. 
acquiescence understanding should be given the reading most natural 
to its text. Acquiescence exists when a public official is aware of 
torturous activity and breaches a legal responsibility to intervene to 
prevent such activity. This legal responsibility can derive from any 
applicable law, international or domestic.283  
The first authoritative agency interpretation of acquiescence 
concluded that the “legal responsibility” referred to in the Senate 
understanding included duties arising under international law. 
Because the United States treated the CAT as non-self-executing 
until FARRA and its regulations established procedures for 
immigration judges to decide CAT claims in removal proceedings, it 
was up to the INS, the agency then responsible for executing 
removals, to ensure compliance by not deporting individuals 
protected by the treaty.284 In May 1997, the INS General Counsel, 
David A. Martin, issued a memorandum explaining the CAT’s 
requirements. In discussing the acquiescence understanding, the 
memo explained that a public official with knowledge of torture “must 
breach a legal duty to prevent the act. Such duty may arise under 
either domestic or international law but in no case shall it be less 
than what is required by international law.”285 When the Justice 
                                                                                                  
282.  FARRA begins by declaring, “It shall be the policy of the United States 
not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to 
a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .” FARRA, supra note 49, § 1242(a). 
283.  See supra notes 245–59 and accompanying text. 
284.  See supra note 65; see also Matter of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 259–
60 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding immigration judges lacked authority to grant CAT relief 
because there was as yet no implementing legislation); id. at 261–64 (Schmidt, 
Chairman, dissenting) (describing INS policies aimed at avoiding violations of the 
treaty in the interim). 
285.  Office of the General Counsel, INS, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Compliance 
with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in the Cases of Removable Aliens 
(May 14, 1997), at 4, reprinted in 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES, No. 10, Mar. 16, 
1998, at 375. Martin also interpreted the understanding to require that an official 
“know about the specific act of torture before it occurs,” which was an unduly 
narrow reading given the understanding’s use of the broader term “awareness” 
and its reference to “activity constituting torture” rather than to a specific act. See 
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Department issued the CAT regulations in 1999, it simply 
incorporated the Senate understanding into the regulatory definition 
of torture without elaborating further on the meaning of “legal 
responsibility” in the regulation or official commentary.286 However, it 
did not disavow the INS General Counsel’s interpretation of “legal 
responsibility” as including international law duties. 
In conclusion, U.S. law calls for looking to applicable 
international law as well as the domestic law of the country in 
question to determine whether officials are abiding by their legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent torture. As Part II explained, 
under the CAT, as well as the ICCPR and a number of regional 
human rights treaties, that legal responsibility is a duty of due 
diligence.287 One question this raises is whether officials who fail to 
respond to torture with due diligence can be found to have violated a 
legal responsibility under international law if their nation is not a 
party to the CAT or any other treaty that imposes such a duty. That 
question will rarely arise given that 171 countries have ratified the 
CAT and 173 are parties to the ICCPR.288 But at a minimum, all 
States should be held to the CAT’s obligations, regardless of whether 
they have ratified the treaty. Article 3’s non-refoulement requirement 
is designed to prevent persons from being sent to places where they 
                                                                                                  
Rosati, supra note 12, at 538 (“To the extent that the INS position excludes a 
public official’s willful blindness or actual knowledge of general torture practices 
by requiring a public official to have actual knowledge about a specific act of 
torture, the INS position is inconsistent with the Senate understanding of the 
treaty obligations.”). 
286.  CAT Regulations, supra note 50, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8483, 8491. The 
commentary’s only discussion of what acquiescence means was to repeat the 
observation made several times in the ratification history that “acquiescence 
includes only acts that occur in the context of governmental authority.” Id. at 
8483; see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing textual 
evidence that this statement encompasses private torturous activity that occurs 
with an official’s awareness and breach of legal responsibility). 
287.  A legal responsibility could also exist under customary international 
law, but it is unclear whether an obligation of due diligence has been so 
universally accepted that it has assumed that status. The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has asserted that, at least in the area of 
gender-motivated violence, a due diligence obligation has ripened into customary 
international law. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
288.  See ICCPR, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=
IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/5U3W-NFBZ ] (listing parties to the ICCPR). For 
the due diligence obligation to prevent torture under the ICCPR, see supra notes 
143–47 and accompanying text. 
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are in danger of being tortured, and it would undermine the treaty’s 
object and purpose to allow the return of an individual merely 
because of the receiving State’s refusal to acknowledge the CAT’s 
fundamental requirement that States take effective measures to 
prevent torture.289 If a country’s domestic law, or another treaty it is 
party to, imposes more stringent or specific duties, its officials should 
be held to those legal responsibilities as well. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING A “DUE DILIGENCE” STANDARD 
This final Part offers several observations on what a due 
diligence test for CAT acquiescence might look like in practice, and 
responds to some potential objections. Is it appropriate for U.S. courts 
to judge the adequacy of other countries’ efforts? Is due diligence too 
vague to be workable? Why not just use the protection-focused 
standard of asylum and find acquiescence whenever the State is 
unable to prevent torture? This Part also includes a proposal for a 
regulatory amendment to help clarify the appropriate standard for 
acquiescence. 
The general contours of the due diligence standard as 
developed by human rights courts and treaty bodies were described in 
Section II.A. Two points are particularly worth noting. First, due 
diligence is an obligation of means, not results. It requires officials to 
take measures within their power and authority that are reasonably 
calculated to be effective in preventing and redressing acts of 
torture.290 The fact that officials prove unable to prevent torture from 
occurring does not necessarily mean they breached a legal duty. 
                                                                                                  
289.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1). Not making protection against removal 
depend on whether the receiving country has ratified the CAT is consistent with 
the approach taken in the U.S. “lawful sanctions” understanding, under which 
punishments authorized under another country’s laws are not considered “lawful” 
if they undermine the object and purpose of the CAT. See supra note 248 and 
accompanying text. 
290.  Commentators broadly agree on this point. See 2019 SR Report, supra 
note 180, ¶ 23; Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 310, 327–34; Lisa 
Grans, The State Obligation to Prevent Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: The Case of Honour-Related Violence, 15 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 695, 705, 717–18 (2015); Patricia Tarre Moser, The Duty to 
Ensure Human Rights and Its Evolution in the Inter-American System: 
Comparing Maria da Penha v. Brazil with Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United 
States, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 444–45 (2012); Monika Hakimi, 
State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L., 341, 371–76 (2010). 
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Nonetheless, results are relevant as a benchmark. Article 2 of the 
CAT obliges States to take “effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture” in their 
territory.291 If the measures taken prove ineffective, the State may 
need to revise its approach and expand its efforts. The persistence of 
widespread abuses may be evidence that the State is not doing 
enough to address the problem.292 For example, a persisting pattern of 
violence against women or LGBTQI people may reveal that changes 
in laws, police and judicial practices, protective services, and 
government messaging are needed in order to adequately investigate, 
prosecute, and punish acts of torture, enable victims to access 
protection, and address societal attitudes that fuel the violence. And 
while due diligence takes into account that there are limits—
stemming both from resource constraints and the need for due 
process—on the ability of governmental actors to prevent acts of 
torture, the due diligence jurisprudence has been generally hostile to 
the idea that States lack the ability to make needed reforms.293 
A second and related point is that due diligence operates on 
both individual and systemic levels. On the individual level, when 
officials become aware that a person faces an imminent risk of torture 
they must take reasonable measures to avert the harm and, if it 
occurs, take all appropriate steps to investigate, prosecute, and 
punish the offender.294 At the systemic level, States have an 
                                                                                                  
291.  CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
292.  See Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶ 4 (“If the measures adopted by the 
State party fail to accomplish the purpose of eradicating acts of torture, the 
Convention requires that they be revised and/or that new, more effective 
measures be adopted.”); see also Hakimi, supra note 290, at 373–74 (noting that 
“the reasonableness of the state’s measures depends on the scope of the problem” 
and persisting widespread abuse “is evidence that the state is not doing enough to 
satisfy its obligation”); Anhene Boulesbaa, The Nature of the Obligations Incurred 
by States Under Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 
53, 62, 72–73, 80 (1990) (observing that the obligation to take effective measures 
carries with it an obligation to achieve reasonable results). 
293.  See Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 327–33; Hakimi, supra 
note 290, at 374–76 (discussing constraints that may affect the measures taken to 
prevent human rights violations but observing that courts and treaty bodies 
generally expect States to develop the capacity needed to restrain abusers). 
294.  U.N. treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, and human rights courts have 
repeatedly endorsed this principle. See Hakimi, supra note 290, at 379–81; 2019 
SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 23(b); 2016 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶¶ 11–12; 
2013 SR VAW Report, supra note 158, ¶ 70; Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 18, 21. 
These obligations are rooted not only in Article 2’s general requirement that 
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obligation to change laws or policies that contribute to a problem of 
widespread torturous violence or impede efforts to protect victims.295 
In Opuz v. Turkey, for example, the European Court of Human Rights 
found that the requirement of Turkish law that criminal charges be 
dropped if a victim withdraws her complaint was a contributing 
factor to the escalating violence the complainant suffered and that 
the law represented a failure by the State to exercise due diligence in 
preventing domestic violence.296 In countries where anti-LGBTQI 
attacks occur regularly, enacting or failing to repeal legislation that 
criminalizes same-sex relationships violates the due diligence duty 
because such laws contribute to a climate of violence against LGBTQI 
people and have the predictable effect of deterring victims from 
seeking help from the authorities.297 Statements by influential 
officials or state-endorsed leaders that encourage or condone violence 
against members of a societally-disfavored group can also represent a 
failure of due diligence that makes the State responsible when such 
attacks occur.298 
                                                                                                  
States take effective preventive measures, but also in the more specific 
requirements of Article 4 (duty to criminalize acts of torture and make them 
punishable by appropriate penalties), Article 6 (duty to take offenders into 
custody when the available information warrants), Articles 12–13 (duty to conduct 
a prompt and impartial investigation and protect complainant and witnesses from 
retaliation), and Article 14 (duty to provide access to avenues for redress). 
295.  Special rapporteurs and scholars have highlighted this aspect of due 
diligence. See 2019 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 23(a); 2013 SR VAW Report, 
supra note 158, ¶¶ 70–75; Grans, supra note 290, at 713–15; Goldscheid & 
Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 307–09; Hakimi, supra note 290, at 382–83. 
296.  Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 137-46, 168 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
June 9, 2009). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 153–56 and 
accompanying text. 
297.  See 2016 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 15 (discussing the link between 
the criminalization of LGBTQI persons and violence against the LGBTQI 
community by both state and non-State actors); see also Human Rights Council, 
19th Sess., Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/19/41, ¶ 42 (2011) (making similar observations). 
298.  A substantial body of social science research supports the conclusion 
that certain kinds of denigrating speech that dehumanizes members of an out-
group have conditioning effects on listeners that can contribute to their 
willingness to tolerate or engage in violent attacks, especially when the speaker 
holds authority. See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL l7–18, 223–
47 (2017); Jonathan Leader Maynard & Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech and 
Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention, 9 
GENOCIDE STUDS. & PREVENTION INT’L J. 70, 77–86 (2016); see also 2019 SR 
Report, supra note 180, ¶ 21 (finding that statements by political/religious leaders 
endorsing domestic or honor-based violence and discriminatory political 
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The due diligence standard differs from the “willful blindness” 
approach in two major respects. Officials who “turn a blind eye” to 
torturous activity are unquestionably not exercising due diligence and 
will be guilty of acquiescence under either approach. But due 
diligence also captures situations where officials, while not totally 
passive, fail to do all that can reasonably be expected of them to 
protect the victim and prosecute and appropriately punish the 
perpetrators. Cases in which appellate courts have upheld no-
acquiescence findings in situations where the authorities responded 
in a half-hearted or pro forma way when a threat or act of torture was 
reported, or where country evidence shows that officials are likely to 
respond in a less-than-diligent way to the harm the applicant faces 
(for example, where there is a pattern of gang or cartel infiltration of 
police departments, or men committing serious acts of domestic 
violence are routinely only briefly detained and then released), should 
come out differently under a due diligence test. 299  
The willful blindness standard also does not easily 
accommodate viewing systemic failures that contribute to the 
perpetuation of torture as a form of acquiescence. Due diligence 
provides a framework for examining whether the measures taken by 
the State to address a problem of torturous violence are reasonable 
and proportional to the gravity of the situation, or conversely, 
whether its failures to take needed steps to address the problem 
contributes to the risk of torture the applicant faces.300 For example, 
in Fuentes-Erazo, where the Eighth Circuit found no acquiescence 
even though it acknowledged that the record showed widespread 
impunity for domestic violence in Honduras, ineffectual laws and 
institutions to protect victims, and the government’s failure to 
provide necessary resources to address the problem,301 a due diligence 
standard would have compelled a different outcome. And in those 
cases where appellate courts have found acquiescence based on 
                                                                                                  
narratives that encourage violence against marginalized groups may amount to 
incitement under the CAT’s torture definition). 
299.  For discussion of case examples, see supra notes 115–20, 132–33 and 
accompanying text. 
300.  As the Committee Against Torture explained in its General Comment 
No. 2, the State is responsible in “contexts where the failure of the State to 
intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted harm.” Gen. 
Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶ 15. 
301.  Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 850–54 (8th Cir. 2017). For 
further discussion of this case, see supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
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systemic failures—as in a Seventh Circuit decision finding that 
Jordan acquiesces to honor killings, even though it prosecutes 
offenders, because it has not changed laws that enable men 
committing them to receive light sentences and offers no mechanism 
to protect targeted women besides protective custody302—the results 
make more sense when acquiescence is conceptualized as a failure to 
exercise due diligence, rather than as “willful blindness.” 
One possible objection to using a due diligence standard is 
that it requires passing judgment on the adequacy of another State’s 
preventive efforts, which implicates sensitive foreign policy concerns. 
A government may be offended by the charge that it fails to act 
diligently to protect its citizens from torture. One might argue that if 
such accusations are to be made, they should come from foreign policy 
officials, not judges.303 In actuality, it is rare that another country 
cares why the United States declines to deport someone; governments 
are usually happy not to be required to take back disgruntled citizens 
who have emigrated.304 On occasion, though, another country may 
take offense if a court impugns the diligence of its anti-torture efforts. 
So what? That is precisely what the CAT calls for—the treaty 
requires all State parties to determine, before returning someone, 
whether that person would be in danger of being tortured by, or with 
the consent or acquiescence of, officials in another country.305 To the 
                                                                                                  
302.  Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2011). 
303.  Cf. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 332 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that 
giving Chevron deference to the agency standard on whether a country’s 
government is responsible for persecution in asylum cases based on its inability to 
control the persecutors is particularly appropriate because it is “a matter of no 
small significance to foreign relations”). 
304.  See Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of 
Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 174–75 (2019) (“And though 
immigration decisions are sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign 
relations, the truth of the matter is that it is the very unusual case that affects 
anyone or anything other than the parties themselves.”). 
305.  Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
July 7, 1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (explaining that the issue is whether the 
sending country is violating its own treaty obligation not to return a person to a 
place where that individual would face torture or inhumane treatment, which 
inescapably requires assessing conditions in the country of removal against the 
treaty’s standards); see also William M. Cohen, Implementing the U.N. Torture 
Convention in Extradition Proceedings, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 517, 531 
(1998) (observing that the interests of comity have little weight as an objection to 
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extent that this involves calling out another country for failing to live 
up to its obligations under the treaty, calling attention to the problem 
serves the CAT’s purposes by providing feedback that may help to 
spur reforms.306 Without a due diligence standard for acquiescence, 
courts would still be obliged to determine whether a CAT applicant 
faces likely torture at the hands of State officials, or with an official’s 
consent or willful blindness. Those higher levels of culpability, if 
anything, pose more sensitive foreign policy concerns than basing a 
CAT grant on the failure of officials to exercise due diligence to 
prevent privately inflicted torture. 
Another difficulty posed by the due diligence standard is its 
imprecision. The standard assesses the reasonableness of measures 
taken to prevent torture and the seriousness of officials’ efforts to 
implement them. It does not offer clear benchmarks on exactly what 
measures are required or how much effort is enough.307 But that 
hardly distinguishes it from other reasonableness standards in the 
law; adjudicators are accustomed to making fact- and context-specific 
judgments about what is reasonable in any given set of 
circumstances. 
One might also be concerned with information deficits—will 
immigration judges have the necessary knowledge to accurately 
assess the adequacy of other States’ efforts? That problem, however, 
is endemic to asylum adjudication, in which judges must assess 
conditions in foreign countries in order to determine how likely it is 
an individual will face persecution and whether the applicant’s 
account of past events is credible.308 Judges are able to make those 
determinations by examining evidence from reputable governmental, 
NGO and journalistic sources, often with the aid of expert 
testimony.309 Applying a due diligence standard will certainly present 
                                                                                                  
courts determining whether extradition would violate the CAT, given that it is a 
treaty enforcing a universally recognized prohibition of torture). 
306.  Cf. MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM 24–26, 57–58, 69–81, 
93–94 (2009) (discussing the condemnatory and expressive functions of States 
granting asylum to individuals persecuted by other countries). 
307.  See Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 310–11, 322–23, 339–
41; Edwards, supra note 165, at 215 (noting the difficulties of determining the 
precise measures States are required to take). 
308.  See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating 
the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1270–85 (1990). 
309.  See Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 97, 100 (B.I.A. 2020) (noting 
“Immigration Judges have long relied on expert testimony . . . to help them make 
factual determinations”); Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724–28, 732 
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some hard cases. But in most cases involving deportation to a country 
where privately-committed abuses such as domestic violence or 
torture by organized criminal entities are widespread, it should be 
relatively easy to identify, from readily available country evidence, 
whether there are serious deficiencies in the governmental response 
that allow abuses to continue unchecked. 
A due diligence approach to acquiescence can also be 
criticized for not going far enough. It allows people to be deported to 
face torture by non-State actors in situations where officials, despite 
their diligent efforts, cannot provide protection. The standard used 
for asylum, which asks whether the government is unable or 
unwilling to control the persecutors, would be more protective and 
better serve the objective of preventing all torture.310 It is difficult, 
however, to construe the CAT’s torture definition and U.S. law as 
allowing an exclusive focus on the likelihood of torture without regard 
to whether public officials would be, at least to some degree, at fault. 
When Congress enacted FARRA, it required the immigration 
agencies to adopt the CAT’s torture definition and the Senate 
understanding of “acquiescence.”311 If officials take all reasonable 
measures within their authority to prevent an act of torture but are 
                                                                                                  
(B.I.A. 1997) (discussing the important role of country background information in 
adjudicating asylum claims). 
310.  Some commentators have proposed interpreting acquiescence under 
the CAT as equivalent to the “unable or unwilling” standard applied under the 
Refugee Convention. See FANNY DE WECK, NON-REFOULEMENT UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE 214, 225–27 (2017); Vining, supra note 220, at 355–60; McCorquodale & 
La Forgia, supra note 73, at 217; Weissbrodt & Höreiter, supra note 208, at 51–
52. The Refugee Convention, however, differs from the CAT in that it includes no 
language requiring the State to bear responsibility for persecution, but instead 
focuses on whether an individual is “unable, or owing to such fear [of persecution], 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” Refugee 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2). See Walter Kälin, Non-State Agents of 
Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415, 
418, 423 (2001). Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
has been interpreted to bar refoulement if a person faces likely torture from 
private actors, regardless of whether the receiving country’s authorities bear any 
responsibility for it, similarly lacks the limiting language of the CAT’s torture 
definition. See Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04 ¶¶ 135, 147 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-78986 (on file 
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
311.  FARRA, supra note 49, § 1242(b), (f); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), (a)(7). 
2021] Obscured by “Willful Blindness” 823 
still not able to stop it, it is simply implausible to say that they have 
breached their legal responsibility and acquiesced to the conduct.312 
A due diligence standard provides the highest degree of 
protection against private torture that U.S. law and the CAT’s 
definition of torture will allow.313 It is more protective than the 
current, willful-blindness-based jurisprudence. It is grounded in the 
core requirement of CAT Article 2 that States take effective measures 
to prevent acts of torture, and it accurately reflects what the United 
States understood acquiescence to mean when it proposed adding the 
term to the CAT’s torture definition during the treaty negotiations. 
No change in the CAT regulations is needed for courts to 
conclude that when officials aware of torturous activity fail to 
                                                                                                  
312.  See STEVEN DEWULF, THE SIGNATURE OF EVIL: (RE)DEFINING 
TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 496 (2011) (explaining that human rights 
treaties cannot be plausibly construed to hold a State responsible for torture by 
private actors if the State has done all that can reasonably be expected of it to 
prevent such conduct). 
313.  Much of the gap in protection that remains for situations in which the 
State makes diligent efforts but cannot prevent torture could be filled if U.S. case 
law would recognize that non-State entities exercising effective control over 
territory, such as guerilla groups or gangs in some areas, are de facto public 
officials and should be treated as “person[s] acting in an official capacity” under 
the CAT. Under this analysis, any torturous acts they commit are “inflicted by” an 
official, and there is no need to consider whether the country’s government 
acquiesces. The U.N. Committee Against Torture has endorsed this approach. See 
Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of 
Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. C/GC/2 
(2018) (stating individuals should not be deported to places where they would be 
tortured “at the hands of non-State entities . . . over which the receiving State has 
no or only partial de facto control”); S.S. v. Netherlands, No. 191/2001, ¶ 6.4, U.N. 
Doc. CAT /C/30/D/191/2001 (2003) (stating Article 3 applies if a person faces 
torture from a “non-governmental entity [that] occupies and exercises quasi-
governmental authority over the territory”); see also David, supra note 205, at 795 
(arguing for this approach in U.S. implementation of the CAT). No precedential 
decision of the BIA or federal courts has yet adopted this approach, although the 
Second Circuit has invited the BIA to consider it. See Hernandez-Hernandez v. 
Barr, 789 Fed. App’x 898, 902 (2d Cir. 2019) (directing the BIA to give reasoned 
consideration to whether the MS-13 in El Salvador is a de facto state actor under 
the CAT); Gomez-Beleno v. Mukasey, 291 Fed. App’x 411, 414 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(remanding for consideration of whether the FARC should be treated as the de 
facto government of parts of Colombia). But see D-Muhumed v. Att’y Gen., 388 
F.3d 814, 815–16, 820 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that harm inflicted by Somali 
clans could not meet the CAT’s torture definition because Somalia had no central 
government and “the clans who control various sections of the country do so 
through continued warfare and not official power”). 
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exercise due diligence to prevent it, they breach their responsibility 
under international law and thereby acquiesce. However, an 
amendment along the lines of the following could help to clarify the 
appropriate standard and shift adjudicators away from the prevailing 
misuse of “willful blindness” as a stand-in for acquiescence: 
Acquiescence of a public official requires that the 
public official, prior to the activity constituting 
torture, have awareness of such activity and 
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity. Such legal 
responsibility may arise under either domestic or 
international law but in no case shall it be less than 
what is required by international law. Acquiescence 
shall include any failure by a public official to act with 
due diligence by taking appropriate measures to 
prevent or suppress torturous activity when the 
official has awareness it has been or is being 
committed and has the authority or is in the position 
to take such measures. 314 
The first added sentence is drawn from the 1997 
memorandum issued by the INS General Counsel when the agency 
began applying the CAT in removal proceedings,315 and the second is 
based on the language U.S. diplomats used to explain the meaning of 
“acquiescence” when the United States proposed adding the term to 
the CAT’s torture definition.316 The United States stated that in 
proposing the “acquiescence” concept, it sought to ensure that “public 
officials have a clear duty to act to prevent torture.”317 The above 
amendment to the CAT regulations would effectuate that original 
intent. 
                                                                                                  
314.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (2020) (emphasis added). The first sentence is 
the current text of the acquiescence regulation, and the two underlined sentences 
that follow are proposed additions. 
315.  See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
316.  Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Summary, supra note 212, ¶¶ 29, 45 (defining 
acquiescence in connection with the duty of a public official “to take appropriate 
measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has knowledge or 
should have knowledge that torture has or is being committed and has the 
authority or is in the position to take such measures”); see also supra notes 212–
13, 238–40 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. proposal). 
317.  See Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Summary, supra note 212, ¶ 29. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that the U.S. CAT jurisprudence has 
taken a wrong turn by requiring applicants who face torture by non-
State actors to prove that a public official is likely to respond with 
“willful blindness.” When public officials are aware that an individual 
is in danger of torture, or are aware of a pattern of torturous activity 
targeting similarly-situated people, the definition of “acquiescence” 
that the Senate adopted when the United States ratified the treaty 
makes it clear that the relevant question becomes: Is it likely that a 
public official will “breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene 
to prevent such activity”?318 
“Willful blindness” may at times be germane to whether the 
awareness element of the acquiescence definition has been met, 
because, as legislative history emphasizes, officials who turn a blind 
eye to torture should not be let off the hook by consciously avoiding 
definite knowledge. But willful blindness was never designed to be 
the test for determining whether officials have breached a legal 
responsibility. As a result of the judicial fixation on willful blindness, 
many CAT applicants, including victims of severe gender-based or 
homophobic violence and persons targeted by gangs or drug cartels, 
face deportation and torture in countries where systemic deficiencies 
in laws, enforcement, and protective services deprive them of effective 
protection. 
The CAT and other human rights treaties impose a legal 
obligation on public officials to exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture, including those 
committed by private parties. Both the plain text of the U.S. 
acquiescence understanding and its history support looking to 
international law, as well as any applicable national law, to 
determine the scope of officials’ legal responsibility to intervene. Due 
diligence provides the appropriate standard, grounded in 
international law, for determining whether officials have lived up to 
that legal responsibility, or have breached it and thereby acquiesced 
to torture. 
                                                                                                  
318.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d), 
136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990) (containing the Senate understanding that was 
incorporated in the regulation). 
